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RESTRICTIONS BY FUNDERS AND THE
ETHICAL PRACTICE OF LAW
Alan W. Houseman
INTRODUCTIONL EGAL aid lawyers who accept Legal Services Corporation
("LSC") funding, and abide by its restrictions, may be acting un-
ethically. According to Stephen Gillers, "it can't be so."' The recent
funding restrictions limit whom legal aid attorneys may represent, the
matters upon which they provide representation, and the scope of that
representation.2 Some legal aid attorneys say that the most recent set
of restrictions imposed by Congress on entities funded by the LSC put
legal aid staff attorneys in a position where they may be practicing
unethically.3
This Article considers whether attorneys of programs that receive
restricted funds may comply with the restrictions while ethically prac-
ticing law. Part I discusses the restrictions imposed by legal service
funders. Specifically, it details Congress's restrictions on LSC-funded
entities, prior LSC restrictions, state government restrictions on state-
funded civil legal assistance, and restrictions on certain cases and mat-
ters. Part II analyzes the ethical issues relating to four categories of
current restrictions: (1) funding restrictions on who may be repre-
sented or the cases that may be brought using funds from the funder;
(2) limitations on the type of services that may be provided to other-
wise permissible clients or cases; (3) requirements that attorneys with-
draw from cases or matters in which they are already providing
representation; and (4) requirements that information protected from
disclosure by ethical rules or the attorney-client privilege be released
to parties outside of the program, including government auditors and
monitors. The Article also discusses a 1996 opinion of the American
Bar Association Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
(the "Committee") 4 regarding the ethical obligations of lawyers whose
1. Russell G. Pearce et al., Ethical Issues Panel, 25 Fordham Urb. LJ. 357, 388
(1998) (panel discussion comments of Stephen Gillers).
2. See infra Part L.A (discussing the LSC restrictions in detail).
3. See Pearce et al., supra note 1, at 371-87 (panel discussion comments of Ste-
phen Ellmann); id. at 368-71 (panel discussion comments of Emily J. Sack). The
Committee on Civil Rights and the Committee on Professional Responsibility of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York asserted in a recent article that the
1996 restrictions "conflict with the basic ethical precepts requiring an attorney to act
in the client's best interest, to represent the client zealously and to exercise independ-
ent judgment." Committees on Civil Rights and Prof'l Responsibility, A Call for the
Repeal or Invalidation of Congressional Restrictions on Legal Services Lawyers, 53
Record of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York 13, 55 (1998).




employers receive funds from the LSC for their existing and future
clients, when LSC funding is reduced, and when remaining funding is
subject to restrictive conditions. The Article concludes that, because
future unjustified restrictions may force attorneys into ethical dilem-
mas that can only be resolved through resignation, current restrictions
must be removed, and no further restrictions should be imposed.
I. RESTRIcTIONS IMPOSED BY FUNDERS
A. Congressional Restrictions on LSC-Funded Entities
Entities funded by LSC have suffered considerable cutbacks from
federal LSC sources and have faced an array of unprecedented restric-
tions in the last several years. Since 1995, federal funding for legal
services was cut by 25% from $415 million in fiscal year 1995 to $283
million in fiscal year 1997 and fiscal year 1998.1 In addition, 12.9% of
the recipient staff resigned and 12.7% of local legal services offices
closed from 1995 to 1996.6 State and national institutions that made
up the legal services support and infrastructure lost all of their LSC
funds, as well.7
No longer can LSC-funded recipients receive funds from non-LSC
sources to undertake activities that are restricted by the use of LSC
funds.' Under the new legislation, all of a recipient's funds, regardless
5. See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 502, 111 Stat. 2440, 2510
(1997); Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 502, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-59 (1996).
6. See Legal Services Corp., 1996 Fact Book 9 (1997).
7. See Alan W. Houseman, Address: Interpretation of LSC Restrictions, 25 Ford-
ham Urb. L.J. 285, 287 (1998) [hereinafter Houseman, Address].
8. Although it is not the subject of this Article, it is necessary to point out that
those who care about equal justice for the poor must take whatever steps possible to
remove restrictions on which clients can be served and what legal services can be
provided. Perhaps the most pernicious is the restriction on the use of non-LSC funds
by LSC-funded recipients, which dries up funding sources that have in the past and
would have in the future provided resources to serve the critical legal problems of
low-income clients. In addition, the restrictions on class actions, claiming attorneys'
fees, and welfare reform limit what can be done for clients, putting those served by
LSC recipients at a disadvantage not faced by adverse parties. On the merits, restric-
tions on advocacy are unnecessary to address perceived problems, are unjustified, and
deny low-income persons equal access to our system of justice. The principles of
equal justice do not distinguish between one group of clients and another, between
the deserving and the undeserving poor, whether they be welfare recipients, aliens,
prisoners, or persons charged with drug offenses who reside in a public housing pro-
ject. Nor should low-income persons be foreclosed from bringing class actions to vin-
dicate their rights, claiming attorneys' fees that are available by law, or seeking
necessary relief that is only available from legislative or administrative bodies. It has
been this author's experience as one of the chief lobbyists for preserving an effective,
professional LSC that current arguments about the ethical impact of restrictions have
little appeal to either supporters or critics of civil legal assistance and are not likely to
persuade anyone to oppose restrictions. Unfortunately, the task of removing existing
restrictions and preventing future restrictions requires a long term effort at education
and persuasion and the development of a much more widespread base of public sup-
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of the source, will be restricted. 9 These "entity" restrictions are
unique and unprecedented.
With a few narrow exceptions, recipients are precluded from advo-
cacy and representation before legislative bodies and in administrative
rulemaking proceedings. 10 In addition, they cannot initiate or engage
in any new class actions." They were also required to discontinue
work on pending class actions by August 1, 1996.12 Recipients cannot
claim, collect, or retain attorneys' fees from adverse parties on cases
initiated after April 25, 1996, even if the fees are otherwise permitted
by statute.13 Moreover, recipients cannot challenge state or federal
welfare reform laws or formally adopted regulations. 4
The type of cases permitted is limited further. Recipients are pro-
hibited from representing persons in redistricting cases,'S from partici-
pating in any litigation with regard to abortion,1 6 from representing
certain aliens, 7 from participating in litigation on behalf of a person
incarcerated in a federal, state, or local prison, including pre-trial de-
tainees,'" and from representing persons charged with or convicted of
drug crimes in public housing evictions when the evictions are based
on alleged threats to health or safety of public housing residents or
employees.' 9 In addition, LSC-funded recipients must name potential
client plaintiffs and obtain a written statement of facts before they can
engage in pre-complaint settlement negotiations or file suit on the cli-
ent's behalf.2' Recipients may neither conduct training programs to
advocate particular public policies or political activities nor conduct
port. The discussion of this long-term strategy is not the subject of this Article nor the
focus of this symposium, but it is the fundamental task for all of those who believe in
equal justice for low-income people.
9. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-134, § 504, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-53; 45 C.F.RI § 1610.3-.4 (1998).
10. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996,
§ 504(a)(2)-(6), 110 Stat. at 1321-53; 45 C.F.R. § 1612.6.
11. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996,
§ 504(a)(7), 110 Stat. at 1321-53; 45 C.F.R. § 1617.3.
12. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, § 508
(b)(2)(B), 110 Stat. 1321-57 to -58.
13. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996,
§ 504(a)(13), 110 Stat. at 1321-55; 45 C.F.R. § 1642.3.
14. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996,
§ 504(a)(16), 110 Stat. at 1321-55; 45 C.F.R. § 1639.3.
15. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996,
§ 504(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 1321-53; 45 C.F.R § 1632.3.
16. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996,
§ 504(a)(14), 110 Stat. at 1321-53.
17. See id § 504(a)(11), 110 Stat. at 1321-54 to -55; 45 C.F.R. § 1626.3.
18. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996,
§ 504(a)(15), 110 Stat. at 1321-55; 45 C.F.R. § 1637.
19. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996,
§ 504(a)(17), 110 Stat. at 1321-56; 45 C.F.R. § 1633.3.
20. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996,
§ 504(a)(8), 110 Stat. at 1321-56; 45 C.F.R. § 1636.2.
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training on prohibited cases or advocacy activities, such as lobbying,
rulemaking, and collecting attorneys' fees.21
In the fiscal year 1998 appropriations bill, Congress added three
new provisions. 22 The first provision provided LSC with new author-
ity to foreclose recipients from future grants if they substantially vio-
lated the Legal Services Corporation Act or appropriation provisions,
or if they sued LSC because of the restrictions.23 The second provi-
sion eliminated procedural rights to a hearing before an independent
hearing officer when LSC sought to terminate or deny refunding.24
The third provision required LSC recipients who initiate a case to dis-
close to the LSC and the general public the names and addresses of all
parties, the cause of action, and the case number and address of the
court in which the case was filed.25
These restrictions will remain in effect for fiscal year 199926 and,
because of the outcome of the 1998 congressional elections, will likely
remain in effect for the next two years.27 The leadership in the House
and several key leaders in the Senate remain unequivocally opposed
to a federal legal services program.28 The "moderate" forces that sup-
21. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996,
§ 504(a)(12), 110 Stat. at 1321-55; 45 C.F.R. § 1612.8.
22. See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, 111 Stat. 2440 (1997).
23. See id., § 504(a)(8), 111 Stat. at 2511.
24. See id., § 501(b), 111 Stat. at 2510 (stating that sections 1007(a)(9) and 1011 of
the LSC Act "shall not apply to the provision, denial, suspension, or termination of
any financial assistance using funds appropriated in this Act").
25. See id., § 505(a), 111 Stat. at 2511; 45 C.F.R. § 1644.1-.4 (1998).
26. See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act,
1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, tit. V, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-107 (1998).
27. The 1998 elections did not affect the number of Congressmembers who sup-
port and oppose legal services.
28. See Houseman, Address, supra note 7, at 298-301. There were considerable
differences among opponents on how to kill LSC. In September 1995, the House
Judiciary Committee reported out the Legal Aid Act of 1995, H.R. 2277, 104th Cong.
(1995), which would have radically altered the current federally funded legal services
program by eliminating the Legal Services Corporation and by sending funds to the
states for allocation under the rubric of "block grants." Over a four-year period,
block grant funds could be used for only a limited range of services and causes of
action, subject to severe restrictions, and state legal services funds were subject to the
same restrictions as those that applied to the federal funds. The House leadership,
however, wanted to end legal services within two years and decided to let reauthoriza-
tion for the Legal Services Corporation languish. See Legal Services Legislative Up-
date, PAG Update (Project Advisory Group, Nat'l Orgs. of Legal Servs. Programs,
Wash., D.C.), Nov. 1, 1995, at 1, 1. The original House appropriation for fiscal year
1997 included only $141 million for LSC, putting it on a "glide path to elimination."
House Appropriations Subcommittee Holds Hearings on FY 1997 Funding for LSC,
PAG Update (Project Advisory Group, Nat'l Orgs. of Legal Servs. Programs, Wash.,
D.C.), April 17, 1996, at 1, 1. The full House, however, subsequently raised the LSC
funding to $250 million. See 142 Cong. Rec. H7853 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1997). Similar
proposals came from the House Appropriations Committee for fiscal year 1998 and
fiscal year 1999 and were again changed on the House floor. See 144 Cong. Rec.
H6973 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1998); 143 Cong. Rec. H7853 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1997).
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port the restrictions (though many favor increased funding) continue
to play a pivotal role. While the Administration is seeking and will
continue to seek modest increases in funding, it has not sought signifi-
cant changes in the types of recipients that can be funded or the re-
moval of the restrictions on recipients of those funds.2 9
B. Prior LSC Restrictions
The federal legal services program has been restricted since its in-
ception in 1965, but the early restrictions were imposed by the admin-
istrative agency overseeing the program and not by Congress. 3
Congress did, however, attempt to impose some restrictions. For ex-
ample, in 1967, the Senate considered legislation that would have pre-
vented the legal services recipient from filing suit against state and
federal governmental entities.31 In addition, Congress attempted on
several occasions to provide governors the power to veto grants to
entities that engaged in activities that displeased the governor.3 2
1. Legal Services Corporation Act
Congress successfully imposed restrictions on funding through the
Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974 ("LSA Act"). 33 The creation
of the LSC, however, was not an easy legislative accomplishment--it
took four years of hard work.35 President Nixon vetoed the first LSC
bill principally because of his disagreement with the lack of restric-
tions on certain activities.36 He forced the withdrawal of the second
congressional attempt after it passed both Houses of Congress and
was under consideration in the conference committee.37 Finally, on
the third attempt, Congress enacted the Legal Services Corporation
Act of 1974.38 The legislation was reauthorized in 1977,39 but has not
29. See Legal Servs. Corp., Budget Request for Fiscal Year 1999, at 29-31 (1998).
30. See Earl Johnson, Jr., Justice and Reform: The Formative Years of the Ameri-
can Legal Services Program 106-16 (1993).
31. See John A. Dooley & Alan W. Houseman, Legal Services History ch. 1, at 9
(Nov. 1985) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordhain Law Review).
32. See iii. at 9-10.
33. Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1994)).
34. See Dooley & Houseman, supra note 31, ch. 1, at 9-18.
35. See id.
36. See id., ch. 1, at 15-16.
37. See id, ch. 1, at 16.
38. See Warren E. George, Development of the Legal Services Corporation, 61
Cornell L. Rev. 681, 698 (1976); Dooley & Houseman, supra note 31, ch. 1, at 16-18.
39. See An Act to Amend the Legal Services Corporation Act to Provide Authori-
zation of Appropriations for Additional Fiscal Years, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L
No. 95-222, 91 Stat. 1619 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1994)).
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been reauthorized since.4" In fact, the LSC exists because it continues
to receive appropriations from Congress.41
The pre-1996 statutory structure contained procedural require-
ments, partial and total restrictions on certain activities, and provi-
sions for reporting and record keeping. Class action suits, including
appeals or participation as amicus curiae, were permitted only if they
were approved by the director and were consistent with policies set by
the recipient's board.42 Recipients were also required to establish
guidelines for review of appeals "to insure the efficient utilization of
resources and to avoid frivolous appeals."43 In addition, the LSC Act
gave the LSC broad authority to require reports on recipient activi-
ties," prescribe the keeping of records-including access by LSC to
such recordsn5-and to require financial audits,4 6 with the important
qualification that neither the LSC nor the Comptroller General may
access reports or records that are covered by the attorney-client
privilege.47
Several activities were regulated strictly. Recipient staff could not
engage in representation before legislative bodies or administrative
rulemaking unless it was necessary to protect clients' legal rights and
responsibilities or unless they were requested to do so by a govern-
ment agency, legislative body, committee, or a member thereof.48
Although self-help lobbying was permitted with LSC funds,49 the
Government Account Office ruled, however, that grassroots lobbying
was prohibited under the LSC Act.5" Fee-generating cases could only
be undertaken pursuant to LSC guidelines, although there was an ex-
press exception allowing the use of LSC funds if the client sought stat-
utory benefits.51
Finally, the LSC Act prohibited representation of financially ineligi-
ble clients 52 and precluded recipients from providing representation to
eligible clients in criminal matters,53 certain habeas corpus proceed-
40. See Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1994)); Dooley & Houseman, supra note 31, ch. 3, at 3-
5.
41. The LSC Act does not have a sunset provision, thus the Act remains in effect.
See Dooley & Houseman, supra note 31, ch. 3, at 3. Spending was authorized, how-
ever, for fiscal years 1978-80. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996i(a) (1994).
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(d)(5).
43. Id. § 2996f(a)(7).
44. See id. § 2996g(a).
45. See id. § 2996g(b).
46. See id. § 2996h(c)(1).
47. See id. § 2996h(d).
48. See id. § 2996f(a)(5).
49. See id. § 2996f(a)(5)(B)(ii).
50. See U.S. Comptroller General, Formal Op. B-202116 (1981).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(1).
52. See id. § 2996f(a)(2)(A).
53. See id. § 2996f(b)(2).
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ings involving criminal defendants,54 certain abortion cases, 5 school
desegregation cases, 6 selective service and military cases, 7 and cases
involving political activity, including advocacy for or opposition
against any ballot measure, initiative, or referendum.5" The Act im-
posed a number of other restrictions that do not relate directly to rep-
resentation of clients. The Act restricted, however, recipients from
assisting clients by a prohibition of organizing client groups59 and of
conducting training programs to advocate public policies or encourage
political activities, labor or anti-labor activities, boycotts, picketing,
strikes, and demonstrations.6
Congress also restricted the activities of recipient employees. They
could not engage in or encourage others to engage in any public dem-
onstration, picketing, boycott, or strike while participating in work re-
lated to the representation of clients.61 Staff attorneys could not run
for partisan elected office, even on their own time,62 and other em-
ployees could not engage in any political activities during regular
working hours or while representing clients.63 Recipients could not
engage in any voter registration activity or provide voters with trans-
portation to the polls.64
The Office of General Counsel of the LSC has amplified these pro-
visions in a series of LSC regulations 6 and proposed rules.' Gener-
ally, the LSC has interpreted these restrictions narrowly to preserve
the LSC-funded recipients' ability to provide high quality and ethical
representation to eligible clients.67 Even so, some of the restrictions
in the LSC Act regarding representational activities-particularly rep-
resentation before legislative and rulemaking bodies-have disadvan-
taged some clients represented by LSC recipients.
54. See id. § 2996f(b)(3).
55. See id. § 2996f(b)(8).
56. See id. § 2996f(b)(9).
57. See id. § 2996f(b)(10).
58. See id 88 2996e(d)(4), 2996f(b)(4).
59. See id § 2996f(b)(7).
60. See id. § 2996f(b)(6).
61. See id. § 2996e(b)(5).
62. See id. § 2996e(e)(2).
63. See id. § 2996e(e)(1).
64. See id. § 2996(f)(a)(6).
65. The LSC regulations are located at 45 C.F.R. 88 1600-1644 (1998).
66. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 1608 (1994) (proposing regulations relating to prohibited
political activities); 45 C.F.R. § 1632 (1989) (proposing a prohibition on involvement
in the redistricting process). LSC General Counsel Opinions are not catalogued nor
published, but they are available from the Office of General Counsel at LSC. Opin-
ions are issued to individuals or to the entities that represent them.
67. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 1612 (1998) (limiting prohibitions to "self-interest lobby-




In addition to those in the LSC Act, Congress has also imposed a
set of restrictions through appropriations legislation affecting the
funding of LSC. Appropriation restrictions imposed in 1979 and that
continued through May 1997, only restricted the use of LSC funds, but
not the use of non-LSC funds.68 For programs with few non-LSC
funds or with only restricted non-LSC funds, these provisions affected
who could be represented, what types of cases could be brought, and
what could be done for eligible clients in permissible cases. Beginning
in 1980, there were restrictions on representing certain aliens.69 The
first provision prohibited representation of aliens known to be ille-
gally in the United States.7° This was replaced in 1983 by a much
more detailed prohibition that set out various categories of aliens that
could not be represented with LSC funds.71 Since 1985, recipients
68. See 45 C.F.R. § 1610.3.
69. See Joint Resolution Making Further Continuing Appropriations and Provid-
ing for Productive Employment for the Fiscal Year 1983, and for other Purposes, Pub.
L. No. 97-377, tit. VIII, 96 Stat. 1830, 1874-76 (1982).
70. See Dooley & Houseman, supra note 31, ch. 3, at 9.
71. See An Act Making Appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Jus-
tice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies for the Fiscal Year Ending Sep-
tember 30, 1984, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 98-166, tit. II, 97 Stat. 1071, 1090
(1983); Tit. VIII, 96 Stat. at 1874. Public Law 97-377, for example, provided that
none of the funds appropriated in this Act for the Legal Services Corpora-
tion shall be expended to provide legal assistance for or on behalf of any
alien unless the alien is a resident of the United States and is-
(1) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence as an immigrant as
defined by sections 101(a)(15) and 101(a)(20) of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15), (20));
(2) an alien who is either married to a United States citizen or is a parent or
an unmarried child under the age of twenty-one years of such a citizen and
who has filed an application for adjustment of status to permanent resident
under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and such application has not
been rejected;
(3) an alien who is lawfully present in the United States pursuant to an ad-
mission under section 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1157, relating to refugee admissions) or who has been granted asylum by the
Attorney General under such Act; or
(4) an alien who is lawfully present in the United States as a result of the
Attorney General's withholding of deportation pursuant to section 243(h) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1253(h)).
Tit. VIII, 96 Stat. at 1874. Public Law 97-377 further provided:
[a]n alien who is lawfully present in the United States as a result of being
granted conditional entry pursuant to section 203(a)(7) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1153(a)(7)) before April 1, 1980, because of
persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political
opinion or because of being uprooted by catastrophic natural calamity shall
be deemed, for purposes of section 1007(b)(11) of the Legal Services Corpo-
ration Act, to be an alien described in subparagraph (C) of such section.
Id., 96 Stat. at 1874-75.
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were also prohibited from using LSC funds to litigate any abortion
issues.72
Dissatisfied with the provisions in the LSC Act regarding lobbying
and rulemaking, Congress imposed much more stringent requirements
that prohibited grassroots lobbying and that limited direct lobbying or
a direct "communication" to a federal, state, or local official on a
"specific and distinct matter" if the communication was intended to
make the official aware of the issue.73 Additionally, the communica-
tion had to be approved by the project director in accordance with
policy set by the board and only after exhausting all other avenues of
relief. 74 The provisions also limited representation within administra-
tive agencies: "[L]egal assistance is provided by an employee of a re-
cipient to an eligible client on a particular application, claim, or case,
which directly involves the client's legal rights or responsibilities.""
There was, however, a broad exception that permitted communica-
tions that responded to requests from federal, state, or local officials.76
Finally, Congress created requirements that the recipient was com-
pelled to fulfill before recipients could initiate a class action using LSC
funds.' Class actions could only be brought "for the primary benefit
of individuals who are eligible for legal assistance" 78 and had to be
approved by the project director in accordance with policies of the
local recipient board. Moreover, the project director also had to de-
termine that the target of the class action was not likely to change the
practice or policy, that the practice or policy continued to adversely
affect clients, that the recipient gave notice of its intention to file a
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(8) (1994).
73. See An Act Making Appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Jus-
tice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies for the Fiscal Year Ending Sep-
tember 30, 1991, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 101-515, § 607, 104 Stat. 2149,
2149-50 (1990); Dooley & Houseman, supra note 31, ch. 4, at 4-9.
74. The procedural requirements were that:
(A) the project director of a recipient has expressly approved in writing the
undertaking of such communication to be made on behalf of a client or class
of clients in accordance with policy established by the governing body of the
recipient; and (B) the project director of a recipient has determined prior to
the undertaking of such communication, that-(i) the client and each client
is in need of relief which can be provided by the legislative body involved;
(ii) appropriate judicial and administrative relief have been exhausted; and
(iii) documentation has been secured from each eligible client that includes a
statement of the specific legal interests of the client, except that such com-
munication may not be the result of participation in a coordinated effort to
provide such communications under this proviso; and (C) the project direc-
tor of a recipient maintains documentation of the expenses and time spent
under this proviso as part of the records of the recipient; or (D) the project
director of a recipient has approved the submission of a communication to a
legislator requesting introduction of a private relief bill.
§ 607, 104 Stat. at 2150.
75. Id-, 104 Stat. at 2149.
76. See id., 104 Stat. at 2150.
77. See id., 104 Stat. at 2148-50.
78. Id., 104 Stat. at 2149.
1999] 2195
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
class action, and that alternative dispute resolution efforts have failed
or would be adverse to the clients' interests.79
C. State-Created Restrictions
The federal government is not the only source of funding restric-
tions. Many state funding initiatives have also imposed restrictions
similar to those of federal funding sources. Some state programs that
derive revenue from Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts ("IOLTA")
have imposed restrictions on the use of those funds. For example,
Texas IOLTA funds cannot be used for class action suits, for lawsuits
against governmental entities-except to secure government bene-
fits-or for lobbying for or against any candidate or issue.8 0 The
Texas IOLTA also imposed a fee-generating case provision similar to
the LSC restriction.81
More recent state legislation has imposed additional restrictions.
For example, the recent legislation in Texas to raise filing fees to sup-
port civil legal services includes the Texas IOLTA restrictions, but also
prohibits: (1) abortion-related litigation; (2) lawsuits against a polit-
ical party or candidate; (3) lawsuits against an officeholder for action
taken in the individual's official capacity; (4) representation of any
individual during a time when that individual is confined to a local,
state, or federal jail or prison; (5) legal services to any individual who
is not legally in the country, unless necessary to protect the physical
safety of the individual; and (6) filing claims for actual or punitive
damages in lawsuits to compel the payment of government benefits to
which the claimant is entitled.82 In addition, any attorneys' fees
awarded to the recipient of filing fee funds must be turned over to the
Texas comptroller if any attorney for any party in the case was paid
with funds from a grant under the filing fee law. 3
Another example of state legislation is the recently enacted restric-
tions on Washington State general revenue funds for civil legal repre-
sentation, which prohibit: (1) lobbying, including direct and
grassroots lobbying, rule-making, setting standards or rates, referenda,
initiatives, constitutional amendments, or similar procedures, and self-
help lobbying; (2) class action lawsuits; (3) participating in or identify-
ing the program with political activities, including activities directed
toward political parties, candidates for office, ballot measures, voter
registration, or transportation; (4) representation of undocumented
aliens; (5) fee-generating cases, except when the private bar has re-
79. See id.
80. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. tit. 2, subch. A, art. XI, § 4(F) (West 1998).
81. IOLTA funds may not be used in matters that might reasonably be expected to
result in a fee award from public funds or the opposing party unless the adequate
legal services were not otherwise available to the person. See id.
82. See id. § 51.903(c)-(d).
83. See id. § 51.903(g).
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jected the case or is not generally available to handle a particular case
type; (6) organizing associations, unions, or federations; (7) picketing,
demonstrations, strikes, or boycotts; (8) engaging in certain solicita-
tion; and (8) conducting training programs to advocate particular pub-
lic policies, encourage political activities, or attempt to influence the
legislative process or rulemaking. s
Most state bar foundations or governmental entities that fund civil
legal assistance activities require the recipient to conduct an audit of
the funds and to provide access to its records as well as other case-
specific information, including, for example, client eligibility informa-
tion. In some states, there is an explicit exception that protects confi-
dential or privileged information. s In states without explicit
exceptions, recipients have often worked out informal practices to
protect such information.
D. Funding for Specific Activities
Finally, funding restrictions are not the only means utilized by state
and federal governments to limit civil legal assistance. Funders have
also limited the types of cases or matters that may be funded with
government resources. For example, the Washington State general
revenue statute limits legal services funding to eleven matters-less
than those that are funded by civil legal assistance programs 6 The
proposed Legal Aid Act of 1995, adopted by the House Judiciary
Committee in September 1995, limits LSC funding to fifteen case or
matter types.8 7 This block grant legislation also required a state that
received block grant legal aid funds to distribute those funds, includ-
84. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 43.08.260 (West 1998).
85. For example, Washington's general revenue statute provides that access to in-
formation does not cover "confidential information protected by the United States
Constitution, the state Constitution, the attorney-client privilege, and applicable rules
of attorney conduct." Id. § 43.08.260(7)(a)(ii)(b)(i).
86. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 43.08.260 provides:
Any money appropriated by the legislature from the public safety and edu-
cation account pursuant to RCW 43.08.250 or from any other state fund or
account for civil representation of indigent persons shall be used solely for
the purpose of contracting with qualified legal aid programs for legal repre-
sentation of indigent persons in matters relating to: (a) Domestic relations
and family lav matters, (b) public assistance and health care, (c) housing and
utilities, (d) social security, (e) mortgage foreclosures, (f) home protection
bankruptcies, (g) consumer fraud and unfair sales practices, (h) rights of res-
idents of long-term care facilities, (i) wills, estates, and living wills, (j) elder
abuse, and (k) guardianship.
87. Id. § 43.08.260.
Section 2(4) of the Legal Aid Act of 1995 provides:
(A) The term "qualified cause of action" means only a civil cause of ac-
tion which results only from-
(i) landlord and tenant disputes, including an eviction from hous-
ing except an eviction where the prima facie case for the evic-
tion is based on criminal conduct;
(ii) foreclosure of a debt on a qualified client's residence;
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ing IOLTA funds, only for the fifteen case or matter categories, and
subjected the state to all of the restrictions imposed on the federal
block grant funds, even if the recipient did not receive any of the fed-
eral block grant funds.88
II. ETHICAL ISSUES RAISED BY FUNDING RESTRICTIONS
Recent legislation has restricted the cases, clients, and types of serv-
ices that federally funded legal service providers may handle. This
part discusses the ethical issues raised by such restrictions.
A. Restrictions on Representation and Case Categories
Many of the restrictions described above do not pose any significant
ethical issues for legal aid attorneys because the program may deter-
mine that they cannot represent the client or undertake the case
before a client is accepted or a complaint is filed.89
The ethical rules allow lawyers to make these evaluations at the out-
set of the lawyer-client relationship. Model Rule 1.2(c) provides that
the attorney may limit the goals of representation, subject to the in-
formed consent of the client.9" The official comment to the rule points
out that:
The objectives or scope of services provided by a lawyer may be
limited by agreement with the client or by the terms under which
(iii) the filing of a petition under chapter 7 or 12 of title 11, United
States Code, or under chapter 13 of such title unless a petition
of eviction has preceded the filing of such petition;
(iv) enforcement of a debt;
(v) an application for a statutory benefit;
(vi) appeal of a denial of a statutory benefit on a statutory ground;
(vii) child custody and support;
(viii) action to quiet title;
(ix) activities involving spousal or child abuse on behalf of the
abused party;
(x) an insurance claim;
(xi) competency hearing;
(xii) probate;
(xiii) divorce or separation;
(xiv) employment matters; or
(xv) consumer fraud.
Additional causes of action qualify as a qualified cause of action if they arise
out of the same transaction as a cause of action described in this subpara-
graph unless such additional causes of action are described in clause (i) of
subparagraph (B).
(B) Such term does not include-
(i) a class action under Federal, State, or local law; or
(ii) any challenge to the constitutionality of any statute.
The Legal Aid Act of 1995, H.R. 2277, 104th Cong. § 2(4) (1995).
88. See id. § 3(f).
89. This should be distinguished from withdrawing after a case has been under-
taken because of a change in the law or a change in the circumstances of the client.
90. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(c) (1998).
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the lawyer's services are made available to the client. For example,
a retainer may be for a specifically defined purpose. Representa-
tion provided through a legal aid agency may be subject to limita-
tions on the types of cases the agency handles. 91
A civil legal assistance attorney can conform to prospective restric-
tions on representing undocumented or other categories of aliens,
prisoners, or those who are financially ineligible when deciding whom
to represent. Similarly, such attorneys can usually determine that the
case is a restricted type that they cannot pursue, such as abortion,
school desegregation, selective services, habeas corpus actions involv-
ing prisoners seeking review of their conviction or the basis for their
confinement, redistricting, drug-related public housing evictions, and
criminal cases. It is sometimes more difficult to comply with the re-
strictions on fee-generating cases, but virtually all such restrictions
permit representation if the private bar is not available or does not
generally take a particular case type.92 The problem with funding that
limits representation to certain cases or matters is in determining
whether the client's problem fits wvithin the case type for which repre-
sentation is permitted.93
The prohibition against initiating or participating in a class action
lawsuit may be characterized as a case-type prohibition. In some cir-
cumstances, however, attorneys cannot determine whether a class ac-
tion is appropriate until after the client is accepted for service on a
permitted case type. Similarly, welfare cases may arise in which a rea-
sonable determination can be made at the outset that the case does
not involve a prohibited welfare reform challenge, and a few where it
is clear at the outset that a welfare reform law will have to be chal-
lenged. Attorneys in some welfare cases, however, will not be able to
determine before the client is accepted whether they will need to chal-
lenge a welfare law. Unless a recipient refuses to take any welfare
cases, it is likely to confront situations in welfare cases where it cannot
determine until after the client and case are accepted what action
should be pursued on the client's behalf. A more complex framework
is needed to analyze these and other situations.
B. Limitations on the Type of Services that May Be Provided to
Otherwise Permissible Clients or Cases
The most recent restrictions imposed by Congress on what LSC-
funded recipients can do for an eligible client on a permissible case
raises issues that have never been faced by most LSC-funded civil
91. Id Rule 1.2 cmt. 4.
92. For the LSC regulation on fee-generating cases and the exceptions for repre-
sentation that are permitted, see 45 C.F.R. § 1609 (1998).
93. For example, does refinancing a home or a family farm fall ithin the Wash-
ington State list of "home protection bankruptcies" or "mortgage foreclosures" or the
Legal Aid Act's list of "foreclosure of a debt on a client's residence"?
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legal assistance recipients. The 1996 restrictions are unique in two
respects.
First, they prohibit a recipient from using its non-LSC funds to en-
gage in class actions and certain welfare reform activities or to claim,
collect, or retain attorneys' fees.9 4 Until 1983, restrictions on LSC
funds did not restrict what a recipient could do for a client within the
judicial or administrative adjudicatory system. 95 Since 1983, there
have been restrictions on using LSC funds for some class actions,
rulemaking, and direct and grassroots lobbying. 96 Many recipients
could, however, use non-LSC funds to engage in those activities and
thus could, if the recipient chose, bring class actions and undertake
representation before rulemaking or legislative bodies.97 This was not
the case for all recipients because certain restrictions were imposed on
the use of non-LSC funds.98 For example, some restrictions prohib-
ited the filing of certain class actions, rulemaking, or lobbying.99
Second, the pre-1996 restrictions on the use of LSC funds for class
actions, rulemaking, and legislative representation were not absolute.
They permitted representation in most circumstances.100 For exam-
ple, the restriction on class actions was directed at suits against gov-
ernment defendants and not private defendants, and was primarily
procedural.101 It required that the project director approve the suit
according to policies established by the board, that the action primar-
ily benefit eligible clients, and that the recipient provide notice to the
government and attempt to resolve the matter without litigation.102
Similarly, recipients could use LSC funds to engage in rulemaking if
they were representing "an eligible client on a particular application,
claim or case, which directly involve[d] the client's legal rights or re-
sponsibilities." 103 In addition, recipients could use LSC funds to com-
municate directly to an elected official "on a specific and distinct
matter where the purpose of such communication was to bring the
94. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
95. See supra Part I.B.1.
96. See supra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
97. See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 9-19 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 9-19 and accompanying text.
101. See An Act Making Appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Jus-
tice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Programs for the Fiscal Year End-
ing September 30, 1995, and Making Supplemental Appropriations for These
Departments and Agencies for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1994, and for
other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 103-317, § 403(b)(1), 108 Stat. 1724, 1759 (1995) (re-en-
acting the class action limitations in Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State,
the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 101-515, § 607,
104 Stat. 2101, 2148-49 (1990)).
102. See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-515, § 607, 104 Stat. 2101, 2148-
49 (1990).
103. Id., 104 Stat. at 2149-50.
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matter to the official's attention" after certain procedural steps were
followed."° Moreover, recipients could use LSC funds to respond to
a request from a federal, state, or local official.10 5
The 1996 restrictions differ in several respects from the 1984-1995
restrictions. The restrictions on attorneys' fees, class actions, and wel-
fare reform challenges apply to all funds of a recipient and have no
substantive or procedural exceptions." 6 The restrictions on rulemak-
ing and lobbying are not absolute. Recipients can use non-LSC funds
to comment in public rulemaking proceedings, which are virtually all
rulemaking proceedings. 0 7 Recipients can also use non-LSC funds to
respond to a written request for information or testimony from a gov-
ernment agency, legislative body or committee, or a member of such
agency, body or committee, if the response is made only to the parties
that made the request and the recipient does not arrange for the re-
quest to be made.'08 If a recipient does not have unrestricted non-
LSC funds or does not have the contacts to receive written requests,
however, then it may not be able to undertake representation in
rulemaking or before legislative bodies.
Importantly, LSC recipients may refer restricted cases to other civil
legal assistance providers or to pro bono attorneys who undertake the
restricted work. In sixteen states and in another twenty-six major ur-
ban areas, unrestricted civil legal assistance programs that perform
undertake restricted work exist."° There are also many efforts to as-
sure the availability of pro bono law firms and attorneys that handle
restricted cases." 0 Moreover, recipients may transfer non-LSC funds
to another entity or attorney to enable them to undertake restricted
cases."' Recipients may also create an affiliated organization to
which non-LSC funds can be transferred if the affiliated organization
is a legally separate entity, operates with a separate director, uses
some separate staff, operates out of independent office space, uses
104. Id., 104 Stat. at 2149-50.
105. See id., 104 Stat. at 2149.
106. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-134, § 504, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-53 to -57 (1996).
107. See id § 504(e), 110 Stat. at 1321-57.
108. See id., 110 Stat. at 1321-57.
109. See Houseman, Address, supra note 7, at 287. These include Ann Arbor, Bos-
ton, Charlottesville (Virginia), Chicago, Grand Rapids, Los Angeles, Miami, Minne-
apolis, New York, Philadelphia, Portland (Oregon), Saginaw, St. Louis, San Francisco,
Toledo, and Washington, D.C.
110. For example, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association ("NLADA"),
the trade association that represents civil and defender legal aid organizations in the
United States, and the ABA Section on Litigation operate a national Litigation
Assistance Partnership Project that matches law firms to legal services programs who
need pro bono assistance and cannot find such in their local service area. See National
Legal Aid & Defender Ass'n, NLADA Special Projects (last visited Jan. 13, 1999)
<http://www.nada.orglc-specpr.htm>. In addition, the Law Firm Pro Bono Project of
the Pro Bono Institute also assists legal services programs to find pro bono assistance.
111. See 45 C.F.R. § 1610 (1998).
1999] 2201
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
separate equipment, maintains its own accounting and timekeeping
records, and distinguishes itself from the LSC-funded recipient
through signs and other forms of identification.11 2
In considering the ethical issues raised by these new restrictions, the
cases of an LSC-funded civil legal assistance recipient can be broken
down into three categories: (1) cases where there are no restrictions
on the provision of services; (2) cases where recipients can provide
competent service to clients but cannot do everything that is possible
in an unrestricted environment; and (3) cases where the recipient be-
lieves it cannot provide competent representation.
1. Cases Where There Are No Restrictions on Client Services
The vast majority of cases brought by LSC-funded recipients fall
within this category.' 13 Representation is permitted in virtually all
housing evictions and on most housing cases; consumer debt, fraud,
warranty, and utility cases; family law matters such as child support,
domestic violence, custody, visitation, and paternity establishment;
foster care, termination of parental rights, and child welfare matters;
elderly and disability advocacy; migrant and Native American matters;
employment discrimination, wage claims and unemployment insur-
ance, and income maintenance cases including food stamps, Tempo-
rary Aid to Needy Families ("TANF"), Supplemental Security
Income, Social Security, and Veterans Benefits; and most other
work.1 14 The restrictions prohibit only litigation initiated on behalf of
prisoners and certain aliens, and cases challenging welfare reform pol-
icy or involving redistricting, abortion, or a few drug-related public
housing evictions.'1 5 In addition, many aliens can be represented-
including lawful permanent resident aliens and any alien who is either
married to a U.S. citizen, the parent of a U.S. citizen, or an unmarried
child under the age of twenty-one of a U.S. citizen-if the alien has
filed an application for adjustment of status to permanent residency
and such application has not been denied." 6
112. See id. § 1610.8.
113. For example, the 1995 case closure data from LSC indicate that only 0.6% of
cases involved prisoners and 1.17% involved immigration issues, two categories di-
rectly affected by the 1996 restrictions on representation of prisoners and certain
aliens. See Legal Servs. Corp., The Legal Services Corporation Restricted Cases
Tracking Log (1996) (on file with author). Of the 1,657,795 cases closed in 1995, less
than 200 involved class actions according to the reports of recipients made to the
author in an informal survey conducted in 1996. See id. In fact, as noted elsewhere,
there were only 630 open class action cases in June 1996, and many of these were
cases filed years before and open because of the active monitoring of decrees. See id.
114. See supra note 87.
115. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
116. See 45 C.F.R. § 1626.5. In addition, LSC-funded recipients may also represent
lawful temporary resident aliens under the special agricultural worker program; aliens
granted asylum; aliens granted refugee status; aliens granted conditional entrant sta-
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Moreover, LSC-funded recipients may undertake economic devel-
opment work, group representation, and other transactional activities.
They may also represent clients before administrative agencies in ad-
ministrative processes that adjudicate the rights of clients receiving
public benefits from programs such as TANF, Food Stamps, General
Assistance, Social Security, Supplemental Security Income, Veterans
Benefits, Unemployment Insurance, Medicaid, and Medicare. Recipi-
ents may challenge agency policies and procedures in court and repre-
sent clients regarding TANF, General Assistance, Supplemental
Security Income, and others to obtain individual relief from the appli-
cation of a welfare law. Under some circumstances, recipients may
challenge a welfare agency policy on the ground it violates state or
federal law.
LSC-funded recipients may sue governmental entities. Recipients
may directly bring suits representing individual clients or utilize the
procedures for judicial review of agency decisions. Except in the case
of welfare reform litigation," 7 recipients may seek injunctive and de-
claratory relief and may sue to overturn state laws on the ground that
they violate federal law or the Constitution, overturn state agency pol-
icies on the ground that they violate state or federal law, or overturn
local policies on state or federal statutory or constitutional grounds.
Recipients may also lobby to change agency practices. Recipients
can advocate with administrative officials and represent clients to
change the practices of institutions and agencies so that they are more
responsive to the needs of the poor if such advocacy and representa-
tion is not part of a rulemaking proceeding."' For example, recipients
may seek to improve access to services for disabled persons or persons
residing in isolated rural areas or institutions. Recipients can work on
school reform or advocate to ensure that a job-training program pro-
vides effective training to participants. Recipients can participate in
efforts to enforce laws, such as cooperative efforts to enforce local
housing codes, the Community Reinvestment Act, fair housing laws,
civil rights laws, and other laws enacted to protect individuals, if they
do not engage in lobbying or rulemaking.
Finally, LSC recipients may undertake community legal education
("CLE") programs. Recipients may run CLE programs in various
community settings such as community centers, nursing homes, hous-
ing projects, welfare offices, hospitals and the like, if the trainers or
presenters do not affirmatively inquire into whether particular partici-
pants have specific problems on which they need assistance and if they
advise those particular participants to seek such assistance from the
recipient or another recipient. Recipients may establish intake at
tus; aliens granted withholding of deportation; and H-2A nonimmigrant temporary
agricultural workers (concerning the worker's employment contract). See id. § 1626.
117. See id. § 1639.
118. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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courts, government agencies, and community centers. Recipients can
also train clients to handle their own cases pro se and train lay advo-
cates to assist them.
2. Cases Where Recipients Can Provide Competent Service but
Cannot Do All that Would Be Possible
In ongoing representation of eligible clients in generally permissible
cases, attorneys may face situations in which they want to proceed in
one fashion but cannot because of the new restrictions. These issues
may be illustrated through several examples. First, the case may be
one in which statutory fees may be awarded to the prevailing party
and the recipient would normally seek its fees, but cannot do so be-
cause of the prohibition on claiming attorneys' fees. In some cases,
the threat of fees forces the defendant to accept a settlement
favorable to the client. The defendant has less incentive to bargain
and settle with a restricted legal services plaintiff because that plaintiff
cannot collect fees. The client represented by an LSC recipient and
the recipient's attorney are disadvantaged in these circumstances,
although it is possible to undertake the representation in a competent
manner. 
1 1 9
A similar situation arises when a recipient represents an individual
client in an action against a defendant who has injured the individual
client and others similarly situated. The attorney may believe that a
class action would be the best approach to resolve the recurring
problems with the defendant. Often, such situations arise when gov-
ernment agencies take actions that affect many individuals who re-
ceive statutory benefits under policies or practices that may be
inconsistent with statutory law or the Constitution. Similarly, there
are numerous consumer claims, such as policy-based consumer law vi-
olations by a mortgage company, where class actions are critical to
proceed in an efficient manner. The attorney working for an LSC-
funded entity may, however, only represent the individual and cannot
bring a class action. An individual case may successfully help the indi-
119. The Professional Responsibility Counsel of the Washington State Bar Associa-
tion issued an informal letter opinion advising Washington attorneys funded by LSC
that they
may condition representation of the client on waiver or relinquishment of
State or Federal claims for attorney's fees if, and only if, in the reasonable
opinion of the attorney, such a waiver or relinquishment will not effectively
preclude the lawyer from providing competent representation, the attorney
has consulted with the client about the limitations of representation and has
obtained written consent to that representation. If the opinion of the attor-
ney is to the contrary or consent is not obtained, [the Northwest Justice Pro-
ject] must decline representation of the client.
Response to Letter of Inquiry No. 1741 from Cathy J. Blinka, Professional Responsi-
bility Counsel, Washington State Bar Ass'n, to Deborah Perluss, Esq., Northwest Jus-
tice Project 1 (Apr. 29, 1997) (on file with author).
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vidual client, but it cannot resolve the systemic issue unless the case is
appealed and establishes a precedent that the agency follows.
3. Cases in Which the Recipient Believes that It Cannot Provide
Competent Representation
Finally, there are cases in which, either at the outset or after repre-
sentation has commenced, the recipient believes that it can neither
provide competent representation nor raise the legal issues that an
effective lawyer would raise. The best examples arise in the context of
the welfare reform prohibition. Section 504(a)(16) of the 1996 Appro-
priations Act 2 ° prohibits funding to the LSC in order to provide fi-
nancial assistance to any person or entity
that initiates legal representation or participates in any other way, in
litigation, lobbying, or rulemaking, involving an effort to reform a
Federal or State welfare system, except that this paragraph shall not
be construed to preclude a recipient from representing an individual
eligible client who is seeking specific relief from a welfare agency if
such relief does not involve an effort to amend or otherwise chal-
lenge existing law in effect on the date of the initiation of the
representation.' 2'
Similarly, the LSC's regulations track the statutory language in the
case of welfare reform, and they provide as follows:
Recipients may represent an individual eligible client who is seeking
specific relief from a welfare agency, if such relief does not involve
an effort to amend or otherwise challenge existing law in effect on
the date of the initiation of the representation.' 22
LSC defined the phrase "existing law" to include "regulations issued
pursuant [to statutory laws or ordinances] that have been formally
promulgated pursuant to public notice and comment procedures."'"
Thus, under the LSC regulatory framework, recipients may represent
individuals adversely affected by a welfare agency decision and seek
relief from the decision, but may not raise a legal issue that has the
effect of challenging a regulation that was formally promulgated pur-
suant to public notice and comment procedures. Two examples illus-
trate the problem: Social Security Insurance ("SSI") representation
and TANF representation.
120. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-134, § 504(a)(16), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-55 to -56. This provision was in-
cluded in the 1998 Appropriations Act by incorporation. See Departments of Com-
merce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 502(a), 111 Stat. 2440, 2510 (1997).
121. § 504(a)(16), 110 Stat. 1321-55 to -56.
122. 45 C.F.R. § 1639.4.
123. Id § 1639.2(b).
1999] 2205
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
a. Social Security Insurance Representation
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 ("PRA") tightened the SSI disability standard for chil-
dren.'24 The PRA changed the fourth part of a multi-part test. It
eliminated the prior individualized functional assessment test and re-
placed it with a test that makes children eligible upon a showing of
"marked and severe functional limitations."' 25 The other three parts
were not amended in the legislation. The Social Security Administra-
tion ("SSA") has recently promulgated rules for determining SSI
childhood disability"2 6 that eliminate any functional limitations test
and narrowly construe the new statutory test.1 27
Recipient staff who represent eligible children who face termination
of their SSI benefits or new applicants who apply for SSI benefits be-
cause of childhood disabilities, could argue in the administrative hear-
ing that the SSI determination was incorrect under the regulatory
criteria. This is permissible representation under the statutory prohi-
bition and the regulation.
If the client were found ineligible under the test and yet was se-
verely disabled, it might be necessary for recipient staff to challenge
the SSA regulation that interpreted the statutory criteria as inconsis-
tent with the statute. Under the welfare reform prohibition, however,
this latter advocacy is precluded.
b. Temporary Aid to Needy Families Representation
Most LSC recipients represent clients in cases involving TANF
block grants.128 According to the most recent data from Case Service
Reports filed with LSC, these cases make up 3.5% of the overall cases
from LSC-funded recipients.129 Under the welfare reform prohibi-
tion, LSC recipients may represent TANF applicants or recipients to
obtain individual relief from the application of a state or federal wel-
fare reform law in the administrative fair hearing process and may
seek judicial review of an adverse decision only if the recipient does
not challenge existing statutory law or formal regulations.
124. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382(c) (Supp. 111996).
125. Id. § 1382(c)(a)(3)(c)(i).
126. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924 (1998).
127. See Letter from Jonathan M. Stein, General Counsel, and Richard Weishaupt,
Project Head, Health and Human Services Union, Community Legal Services, to
John J. Callahan, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration (Apr. 2, 1997)
(on file with author). Stein and Weishaupt are perhaps the most knowledgeable advo-
cates on the children's disability program. They successfully argued Sullivan v. Zeb-
ley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990), which held that certain regulations of the Department of
Health and Human Services exceeded Congress's delegated statutory authority, see
id. at 541.
128. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-618 (Supp. I 1996).
129. See Legal Serv. Corp., 1998 Fact Book and Program Information 12 (1998).
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For example, assume that a TANF client with a child under six years
of age requested legal assistance to prevent termination of TANF ben-
efits because the client failed to report for a community services job
assignment. The client could not locate childcare near her home or
worksite after checking with four providers and did not have any
friends or relatives who could provide childcare. Also, assume that
the welfare agency has a policy that requires TANF participants to
seek out eight childcare providers in order to prove that they have
sought child care. The policy is not found in a regulation or state law,
but in the caseworker instructions issued by the welfare agency. The
recipient could argue that the policy should not be applied to the cli-
ent because she was unable to find childcare near her home or the job
site. In addition, the recipient could challenge the policy on the basis
that it violates the provisions of the PRA that prohibit states from
terminating assistance based on an individual's refusal to work "if the
individual is a single custodial parent caring for a child who has not
attained six years of age, and the individual proves that the individual
has a demonstrated inability (as determined by the State) to obtain
needed child care.' 30 If the state policy were embodied in a regula-
tion that was formally adopted pursuant to notice and comment, how-
ever, the recipient could not assert in the hearing or in judicial review
of the agency decision that the regulation was illegal because it vio-
lated the federal law.
III. DISCUSSION OF ETHICAL ISSUES RELATING TO THE
SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION
The 1996 restrictions may unacceptably interfere in the attorney-
client relationship and thereby violate the commands of Model Rule
5.4(c).' 3 ' In addition, the restrictions raise the question whether the
recipient may limit the scope of representation so as not to engage in
unethical conduct.
A. Third-Party Interference
Model Rule 5.4(c) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not permit a per-
son who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal
services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional
judgment in rendering such legal services.' 32 In addition, Model
Rule 1.8(f) provides that another person may compensate a lawyer for
representing a client only if "(1) the client consents after consultation;
130. 42 U.S.C. § 607(e)(2).




[and] (2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of
professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship."' 33
There is a long history of prior rules that amplify the basic princi-
ples that underlie Model Rule 5.4(c). Disciplinary Rule 5-107(B) of
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] law-
yer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays him
to render legal services for another to direct or regulate his profes-
sional judgment in rendering such legal services. 13 4 Canon 35 of the
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, the predecessor to the Model
Code, was quite similar in effect. The first paragraph of Canon 35 of
the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics reads:
The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or
exploited by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which inter-
venes between client and lawyer. A lawyer's responsibilities and
qualifications are individual. He should avoid all relations which
direct the performance of his duties by or in the interest of such
intermediary. A lawyer's relation to his client should be personal,
and the responsibility should be direct to the client.
135
Canon 5 provides that "A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Pro-
fessional Judgment on Behalf of a Client."' 36 While the phrase "In-
dependent Professional Judgment"' 37 is not specifically defined in the
Code of Professional Responsibility, a reading of Ethical Considera-
tions 5-1 through 5-24 will establish the spirit with which the lawyer's
duty should be carried out. 3 s Subordination of the lawyer's interests
is implicit, as is the correlative promotion of the client's legitimate
objectives. Ethical Consideration 5-24 explicitly discusses the respon-
sibility of a legal aid lawyer as follows:
Various types of legal aid offices are administered by boards of di-
rectors composed of lawyers and laymen. A lawyer should not ac-
cept employment from such an organization unless the board sets
only broad policies and there is no interference in the relationship
of the lawyer and the individual client he serves .... Although
other innovations in the means of supplying legal counsel may de-
velop, the responsibility of the lawyer to maintain his professional
independence remains constant, and the legal profession must in-
sure that changing circumstances do not result in loss of the profes-
sional independence of the lawyer.' 39
133. Id. Rule 1.8(f)(1)-(2). In addition, client confidentiality must be preserved.
See id. Rule 1.8(0(3).
134. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-107(B) (1981).
135. Id. Canon 35.
136. Id. Canon 5.
137. Id.
138. See id.
139. Id. EC 5-24.
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Section five of the Code's Ethical Considerations further discusses the
lawyer's duties in the face of potential interference by third parties.
Ethical Consideration twenty-one states that:
The obligation of a lawyer to exercise professional judgment solely
on behalf of his client requires that he disregard the desires of
others that might impair his free judgment. The desires of a third
person will seldom adversely affect a lawyer unless that person is in
a position to exert strong economic, political, or social pressures
upon the lawyer.14
It may be possible to read Rule 5.4(c) and its predecessors as render-
ing unethical the employment of an attorney for a civil legal assistance
program that is subject to restrictions on what can be done for cli-
ents.141 Model Rule 5.4(c), DR 5-107(B), and the Ethical Considera-
tions are, however, better interpreted as being directed at third-party
interference once representation has begun.'42 The comment to
Model Rule 1.2 declares that "[r]epresentation provided through a
legal aid agency may be subject to limitations on the types of cases the
agency handles. ... The terms upon which representation is under-
taken may exclude specific objectives or means. "143 Thus, under Rule
5.4(c) and its predecessors, it is not unethical for a civil legal assistance
program or its attorneys to practice law under restrictions imposed
prior to the commencement of representation by a funding source.
This conclusion is consistent with the opinions issued by the Com-
mittee. Formal Opinion 334'4 is the most significant ethical opinion
issued by the ABA regarding civil legal assistance programs for the
poor. In this and earlier opinions, 45 the Committee distinguished be-
tween interfering in individual cases and broad policies that limited or
restricted certain representational activities.'46 The opinion explicitly
stated that the directors of a legal aid organization must not interfere
with representation once it has begun, and that the board should cre-
ate guidelines to determine which cases should be accepted and which
140. Id. EC 5-21 (citation omitted).
141. See Committees on Civil Rights and Prof'l Responsibility. supra note 3, at 54-
55; Pearce et al., supra note 1, at 371-87 (panel discussion comments of Stephen
Ellmann).
142. See Pearce et al., supra note 1, at 381 (panel discussion comments of Stephen
Elhmann).
143. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2 cmt. 4 (1998).
144. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 334
(1974).
145. See id
146. The general holding provides:
We hold that the activities on behalf of the clients of the staff of lawyers of a
legal services office may be limited or restricted only to the extent necessary
to allocate fairly and reasonably the resources of the office and establish
proper priorities in the interest of making maximum legal services available
to the indigent, and then only to an extent and in a manner consistent with
the requirements of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
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should be declined, rather than evaluate such issues on a case-by-case
basis.14 7 In addition, the opinion stated that the limitations should be
made known to the staff and the public.'48
Formal Opinion 334 does not explicitly address whether Congress
may impose restrictions on the scope of client representation, such as
class actions or representation before legislative bodies, without plac-
ing the program or its attorneys in an ethical dilemma. The Commit-
tee focused on the allocation of resources with the objective of
maximizing available legal services. Presumably, Congress or the LSC
could make the same decision as a local recipient board-that re-
sources should be spent on advice, individual representation, and par-
ticipation in administrative adjudications, and not on class actions,
lobbying, or rulemaking proceedings. There is, however, a difference
between a local board allocating resources on the basis of priorities
and Congress making a decision that federal and private funds cannot
be used for class actions or lobbying.
The Committee also suggested that the motive of those imposing
limits must not be improper and cited EC 5-119 as the standard by
which to determine motive. Ethical Consideration 5-1 states that
neither the lawyer's desires, the interests of other clients, nor the in-
terests of third parties should "dilute" the lawyer's duty of loyalty to
the client.150 It is, however, very difficult to prove motive. Here, Con-
gress suggested that the restrictions are necessary in order to conserve
scarce legal services resources for basic day-to-day legal
representation.' 5 1
In Formal Opinion 343,52 the Committee went further. It removed
any distinction between remedies and subject matter priorities. The
opinion dealt with the conduct of a military legal assistance officer
who was subject to a number of restrictions on his or her conduct. 53
Among the number of questions asked and answered by the Commit-
tee was the following:
[Question:] May legal assistance cases be taken on a "limited han-





150. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 5-1 (1981).
151. See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. S14,586-609 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Domenici) ("[Legal Services] ought to be for the individual poor people who
have a need for a lawyer.")





[Answer:] If the client is fully informed at the outset, such limited
services may be provided in keeping with policies established by the
appropriate authority. '5
Thus, the Committee supported the limitation of the scope of repre-
sentation to avoid unethical conduct.
Finally, the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers supports
the conclusion that funding entities may limit the scope of representa-
tion that can be provided. 5 5 Indeed, it seems to permit direction by a
third party once representation has begun. Section 215(2) of the first
Proposed Final Draft of the Restatement of the Law Governing Law-
yers provides that:
A lawyer's professional conduct on behalf of a client may be di-
rected by someone other than the client when:
(a) the direction is reasonable in scope and character, such as by
reflecting obligations borne by the person directing the lawyer; and
(b) the client consents to the direction under the limitations and
conditions provided in § 202 [which deals with consent to conflicts
of interest].' 5 6
Thus, although the Model Rules and the Model Code state that third
parties shall not interfere with the representation of clients, the ampli-
fication of those rules in the Committee's opinions and the Restate-
ment show that third party limitations are acceptable if the client
consents.
B. Scope of Representation
The more substantial ethical question raised by some of the 1996
restrictions, such as the welfare reform and class action prohibitions, is
whether the civil legal assistance recipient funded by LSC could take
on certain cases by limiting the scope of representation so that the
recipient did not engage in unethical conduct.
154. Id
155. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 215 (Proposed Fi-
nal Draft No. 1, 1996).
156. l § 215(2). Stephen Ellmann pointed out in his analysis that the American
Law Institute has just published a revised version of section 215 and its accompanying
commentary. See Pearce et aL., supra note 1, at 379-81 (panel discussion comments of
Stephen Ellmann). The revised draft does not change the text of section 215 itself,
but does extensively revise the accompanying commentary. For example, the com-
mentary observes that law other than the law of lawyering may govern attorney-client
relationships in this context, and thus may permit what the law of lawyering would
forbid. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 215 cmt. a (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 2, 1998). The final comment describes a range of "legal service
and similarly funded representation[s]," and ends with the observation that:
Regardless of the method of appointment, the form of compensation or the
nature of the paying organizations (for example, whether governmental or
private or whether non-profit or for-profit), the lawyer's representation of





1. The Model Rules
The Model Rules provide guidelines regarding the quality and
scope of representation.
a. Competent Representation
Rule 1.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct requires law-
yers to "provide competent representation" to their clients.' 57 If a
lawyer knowingly fails to raise a sound legal issue when representing a
client, such as arguing that a regulation violated a higher statute, the
lawyer would probably be in violation of Rule 1.1 and EC 6-1, both of
which require lawyers competently to represent their clients. 15 8 In ad-
dition, if a client's objectives may only be achieved by bringing a class
action, and the recipient were prohibited from doing so, arguably the
lawyer would not be providing competent representation.
b. Scope of Representation
Rule 1.2 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which is in
effect in most states in some form, provides, in relevant part, that a
"lawyer may limit the objectives of the representation if the client
consents after consultation."' 59 On its face, this rule appears to per-
mit a recipient to limit the scope of representation with an eligible
client that precludes the recipient from challenging a welfare reform
law or formal regulation, or from bringing a class action. Of course,
the client must consent to the limitation, and if the client does not
consent, then the recipient could not represent the client.
In addition, commentary to Model Rule 1.2(c) suggests some limits
on the ability to limit the scope of representation.
An agreement concerning the scope of representation must accord
with the Rules of Professional Conduct and other law. Thus, the
client may not be asked to agree to representation so limited in
scope as to violate Rule 1.1, or to surrender the right to terminate
the lawyer's services or the right to settle litigation that the lawyer
might wish to continue. 6 °
There is, however, no explicit guideline in the Model Rules or the
commentary on what those limits are or when such limits would be
unethical.
Formal Opinion 96-399'11 referenced this issue on January 18, 1996,
when the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Re-
sponsibility interpreted Model Rule 1.2 in light of Model Rules 1.7(b)
157. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.1 (1998).
158. See id.; Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 6-1 (1981).
159. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(c).
160. Id. Rule 1.2 cmt. 5.




and 2.1 in an opinion that addressed LSC funding restrictions, includ-
ing the welfare reform prohibition. It examined the situation where a
case and client satisfy the funding statute at the start of the represen-
tation, but not later in the representation. The Committee asked
whether the lawyer might ethically continue representation if there is
a chance that future restrictions may "preclude advisable or necessary
action."' 62 The Committee reasoned that the lawyer may not ask for
the potential client's consent unless the lawyer reasonably believes
that the possibility of the future restriction would adversely effect the
client's interests. The Committee concluded that if the restriction can
"fairly be anticipated" and that if other competent services are avail-
able to the client, then the lawyer should advise the client to seek
other competent services. 163 Thus, only a vague framework exists for
determining when the limits are unethical.
2. Application to the Welfare Reform Prohibition
Under the Committee's analysis, when a case or matter covered by
the welfare reform prohibition may require a legal challenge to a for-
mal regulation, the recipient must discuss this possibility with the cli-
ent. Further, the recipient may only proceed if the client knowingly
consents to the limited representation. If the recipient reasonably be-
lieves that the client's representation may be adversely affected if un-
dertaken by the recipient, the recipient must decline representation
and refer the case to another competent lawyer to undertake the rep-
resentation."6 If there are no other lawyers available, as is the case in
some service areas, then either the client would go wvithout represen-
tation or the client would have to consent to inadequate representa-
tion, an intolerable situation.
This analysis makes a number of assumptions about whether effec-
tive representation may be provided even if the recipient could not
challenge a regulation as invalid under higher statutory or constitu-
tional law. As a practical matter, it is possible to limit representation
in welfare matters to administrative proceedings that normally may
not consider the validity of a regulation in light of statutes and the
Constitution. Once the administrative proceeding is completed and
the client has not prevailed, the recipient must refer the case to an-
other attorney or decline further representation before proceeding
further with the client's case.
In addition, it may be possible to stay within the framework of the
welfare reform prohibition as it is interpreted by the LSC because the






the Supplementary Information (preamble) to the LSC regulation
indicates,
when representing an eligible client seeking individual relief from
the actions of an agency taken under a welfare reform law or regula-
tion, a recipient may challenge an agency policy on the basis that it
violates an agency regulation or State or Federal law or challenge
the application of an agency's regulation, or the law on which it is
based, to the individual seeking relief.
165
Moreover, Formal Opinion 96-399 was written prior to the implemen-
tation of the 1996 and 1997 appropriations restrictions and prior to the
LSC interpretations of the scope of those restrictions. In fact, as dis-
cussed below, the opinion made a number of assumptions about the
appropriations restrictions that were incorrect. One such inaccurate
assumption, for example, was that the welfare reform prohibition
would cover most of the welfare cases brought by legal services
recipients.1 66
Finally, most representation will not involve a challenge on statu-
tory or constitutional grounds to a welfare reform law because most of
the laws enacted by states do not raise colorable constitutional issues,
and the laws will be within the state's discretion to enact under the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996.167 Federal laws and regulations no longer provide a framework
for the laws enacted by states to implement the TANF Block Grant,
and states are no longer required to establish legal entitlements to
assistance if eligibility and other criteria are met.1 68 In these cases,
there should be no problem in proceeding with the representation,
and there may be no need to qualify the representation in a retainer
agreement or letter of engagement.
3. Application to Class Actions
The prohibition of the initiation or participation in a class action
lawsuit may prevent the recipient from providing competent represen-
tation. A distinction must be made between representation of individ-
uals and representation of a class. Class actions are brought on behalf
of a class of clients primarily because it is more efficient to resolve the
issue for the class than to bring a series of individual cases one at a
time, and because they often lead to remedial orders that address the
systemic problems underlying the legal issue. Class actions are rarely
165. 45 C.F.R. § 1639.1-.6 (1998).
166. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-
399.
167. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 8,
21, 25, 42 U.S.C.)
168. See Alan W. Houseman, Legal Representation and Advocacy Under the Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 30 Clearing-
house Rev. 932, 933 n.5 (1997).
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necessary to effectively represent an individual client, although there
are circumstances where it may be necessary to do so.1 69 The perti-
nent ethical issue arises when a class action is necessary to effectively
assert and protect an individual client's rights.
Formal Opinion 334 accepted this distinction and held, in the con-
text of whether the board of a legal services program could prohibit
class actions, that any limitation upon the class filing ability of a law-
yer who represents a client for whom class relief is essential is
unethical. 170
It will be a very rare situation, however, where a recipient must file
a class action to remedy an individual's legal rights and cannot limit its
scope of representation to individual non-class actions at the time that
representation is begun.171 When a situation arises that does require
the filing of a class action in order to competently represent an indi-
vidual client, then the recipient must forego representation and refer
the case to another lawyer or, if no lawyer is available, provide no rep-
resentation or proceed with client consent to limited representation.
4. Application to Lobbying or Rulemaking
A further set of ethical issues may arise under the prohibitions on
lobbying and rulemaking in the 1996 provisions because they cover all
of an LSC-funded recipient's funds. It seems appropriate, however,
for a civil legal assistance recipient to limit the scope of representation
to preclude lobbying or participation in rulemaking.11
The clearest statement supporting the assertion that a lawyer is re-
quired to pursue representation in a legislative or administrative
rulemaking forum is in the old Canons of Ethics.
A lawyer openly and in his true character may render professional
services before legislative or other bodies, regarding proposed legis-
lation and in advocacy of claims before departments of government,
upon the same principles of ethics which justify his appearance
before the Courts; but it is unprofessional for a lawyer so engaged
... to use means other than those addressed to the reason and un-
derstanding to influence action.173
169. See Marie A. Failinger & Larry May, Litigating Against Poverty: Legal Serv-
ices and Group Representation, 45 Ohio St. LJ. 1, 17-18 (1984).
170. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 334
(1974).
171. According to the information provided by the LSC recipients in response to an
LSC request for information on pending class actions, at the time that LSC recipients
were forced to withdraw from pending class actions, over 155 of the 286 recipients
were not providing representation in a class action suit. See Legal Services Corp.,
Legal Services Corporation Restricted Cases Tracking Log passin (1996) (on file with
author).
172. Note that the current prohibition does permit recipients to use non-LSC funds
to respond to written requests of officials and to comment on proposed rules in public
rulemaking proceedings. See 45 C.F.R. § 1612.6 (1997).
173. Canons of Professional Ethics Canon 26 (1970).
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There are no other explicit rules or any relevant opinions of the Com-
mittee under Canon 26.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct discuss lobbying and ad-
ministrative rulemaking in Rule 3.9. The Rule states that the lawyer
in a legislative or administrative tribunal must tell the tribunal that the
lawyer is before it in a representative capacity, and that the lawyer
must follow Model Rules 3.3(a) through (c), 3.4(a) through (c), and
3.5. 174
None of the provisions explicitly mandates that a lawyer must pro-
vide representation before a legislative arena or in an agency rulemak-
ing if the client's interests require it. Indeed, many lawyers do not
provide such assistance, and many legal aid agencies and LSC recipi-
ents do not provide such representation to their clients. On the other
hand, if the professional judgment of the attorney is that an individual
client's interests would be protected or enhanced by approaching a
legislative body or agency policymaking authority, the ethical provi-
sions provide some basis for an argument that such assistance must be
provided to the client, unless such assistance is precluded by prior no-
tice to the client limiting the scope of representation. As noted above,
the commentary to the Model Rules suggests that there are limitations
on the scope of representation provided to some clients that are con-
sistent with the Model Rules, but there is no explicit guideline on what
those limits are or when such limits would be unethical. 175 The ABA
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has addressed
the question in Formal Opinions 324176 and 334. 77 In Formal Opinion
334, the Committee explicitly discussed representation before legisla-
tive bodies and clarified its earlier Informal Opinion 1252, which in-
cluded administrative rulemaking, as well. It found that the proviso
(former DR 2-103(D)(1)) does not prohibit broad limitations by the
governing body of a legal services unit that restrict the services an
attorney may perform for potential clients.178 The opinion qualified
this general statement. First, the board must affirmatively create re-
strictions; without such action, there are no restrictions. 179 Second,
the limitations must be made known to the lawyer prior to the accept-
ance of particular clients, and should be made known to the public
and staff. 8 ° Third, nothing may interfere with representation once it
begins. 81
174. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.9 (1998).
175. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
176. ABA Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Ethics, Formal Op. 324
(1970).








The opinion addressed other concerns as well. It queried whether
limitations on legal service providers are improper because indigents
lack the resources necessary to engage the services of the private, for-
profit bar. The opinion observed that the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility did not ban those limitations.'1 2 The opinion con-
cluded that because legal services resources will always be limited, fair
and reasonable prioritizations that maximize available legal services
are not improper."s Finally, the opinion states that legal service limi-
tations that are inconsistent with EC 5-1 are always improper, and
that whether EC 5-1 has been violated must be considered on a case-
by-case basis."
This opinion does not explicitly address whether Congress may im-
pose similar restrictions on legislative representation without placing
the recipient or its attorneys in an ethical bind. As noted previously,
there is a difference between a local board allocating resources ac-
cording to priorities, and Congress or the LSC prohibiting use of fed-
eral funds and non-LSC funds for lobbying or administrative policy
representation. Presumably, Congress or the LSC could make the
same decision as a local recipient board-that resources should be
spent on advice and adjudications rather than on legislative or
rulemaking proceedings.
IV. OTHER ETHICAL ISSUES
The ethical issues discussed above have been the primary focus of
those analyzing the situation that face civil legal assistance recipients
that are funded by LSC. Civil legal assistance recipients confront,
however, additional ethical issues regarding withdrawal from ongoing
representation and protection of client confidentiality.
A. Withdrawal Issues
Until the 1996 restrictions, withdrawal from ongoing representation
primarily occurred when an existing client was no longer financially
eligible.' LSC regulations required the recipient to withdraw from
such representation consistent with the attorney's professional respon-
sibilities or to transfer the funding of such representation to a non-
LSC source because the financial eligibility requirements only applied
to [SC funds.' 8 6 In addition, as a result of the restrictions on alien
representation with LSC funds imposed in the 1980s, LSC-funded civil
legal assistance recipients withdrew from ongoing representation




185. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
186. See 45 C.F.R § 1611.9 (1998).
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gration circumstances changed and he or she was no longer within the
permissible categories for LSC representation. 8 7 Recipients had to
seek to withdraw from the case, transfer the funding to non-LSC
funds, or permit the attorneys handling the case to continue such rep-
resentation, but without compensation from the recipient because the
restrictions in the 1980s and early 1990s applied only to LSC funds.'88
Few problems arose under these withdrawal procedures.8 9
The 1996 restrictions presented much more difficult withdrawal
problems for LSC-funded recipients than the prior requirements in-
volving LSC representation for clients who became financially ineligi-
ble or whose alien status changed. The first cluster of problems
involved withdrawal from prohibited case categories.' 90 Under the
1996 appropriations provisions, Congress provided a transition period
for withdrawal from pending cases and matters involving class actions,
litigation on behalf of prisoners, and representation of categories of
aliens. Recipients had until August 1, 1996 to dispose of pending
cases in these three areas. 191
According to the LSC reports to Congress regarding these three
categories of cases, 92 LSC recipients were participating in 630 class
actions, 428 cases involving litigation on behalf of prisoners, and 2993
cases or matters in which the client was an alien in one of the prohib-
ited categories. 93 LSC reported that all but eleven of these cases had
been resolved or transferred to other counsel as of August 23, 1996.' 11
It later reported that by the end of the year, all cases and matters had
been transferred or resolved, save one. 195 There was considerable
controversy around several class actions where judges refused to per-
mit legal services attorneys to withdraw or the recipient had difficulty
187. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
189. This conclusion is based on the author's experience providing representation
to LSC recipients as General Counsel to the National Legal Aid and Defender Asso-
ciation and the Project Advisory Group from December 1981 until the present. Be-
tween 1976 and 1981, the author was a senior officer at LSC and was routinely briefed
about recipient compliance issues.
190. See Houseman, Address, supra note 7, at 297.
191. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-134, § 508, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-57.
192. See id. § 508(c), 110 Stat. at 1321-58 (requiring the LSC to report to Congress
every 60 days on the status of such cases and matters).
193. See Houseman, Address, supra note 7, at 297.
194. See Letter from Alexander D. Forger, President of LSC, to the Honorable
Judd Gregg, the Honorable Ernest F. Hollings, the Honorable Harold Rogers, and
the Honorable Alan B. Mollohan 2 (Aug. 23, 1996) (on file with author). These were
the chairs and ranking members of the relevant appropriation subcommittees of the
House and Senate.
195. See Letter from Alexander D. Forger, President of LSC, to the Honorable
Judd Gregg, the Honorable Ernest F. Hollings, the Honorable Harold Rogers, and
the Honorable Alan B. Mollohan 1 (Dec. 21, 1996) (on file with author).
2218 [Vol. 67
RESTRICTIONS BY FUNDERS
in finding alternative counsel.' 96 One case resulted in a state court
opinion that the class action restriction was unconstitutional. 1 9'
In addition to the transition cases, there were other cases or matters
that became prohibited after April 26, 1996, when the restrictions
went into effect without a transition period. In theory, LSC-funded
recipients had to withdraw from cases that involved prohibited wel-
fare reform and from certain drug-related public housing eviction
cases upon the date of enactment. In fact, there were few cases that
fell within these categories, in part because LSC strictly interpreted
these prohibitions in conformity with the statutory language. 198 More-
over, LSC-funded recipients immediately had to cease representation
before legislative bodies and in administrative rulemaking proceed-
ings. Expected cases were those where they could carry on these ac-
tivities within the provisions permitting the use of non-LSC funds to
comment in public rulemaking or to respond to written requests from
legislative or other officials were excepted.199 Here, too, recipients
reported little difficulty in withdrawing from these matters.
196. See Nina Bernstein, Suit Challenges Accord that Bars Legal Services Class-Ac-
tion Cases for Poor, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1996, at D22; Marcia Coyle, Limits at LSC
Compel Lawyer to Quit a Case, Nat'l L.J., July 8, 1996, at A21; Jan Hoffman, Counsel-
ing the Poor, But Now One by One, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1996, § 1, at 47; Claudia
MacLachlan, LSC, Branch Spar over Class Action, Nat'l LJ., Aug. 19, 1996, at A10;
Eva M. Rodriguez, Legal Aid Forced to Drop Cases, Legal Times, Aug. 12, 1996, at 1.
197. On December 24, 1996, a New York state trial judge issued an opinion which
denied a motion to withdraw as counsel for a certified plaintiff class filed by Valerie
Bogart, a staff attorney with Legal Services for the Elderly ("LSE"), a component of
Legal Services of New York City. Ms. Bogart had been lead counsel to the plaintiff
class in Varshavsky v. Perales, 608 N.Y.S.2d 184 (App. Div. 1994), a state court class
action that successfully enjoined the New York State Department of Social Services'
abolition of its In-Home Administrative Hearing Process, thereby reinstating the pro-
cess of the provision of hearings to elderly homebound persons who were too disabled
to travel to hearings at the welfare department. See id. at 185. Since the issuance of
the preliminary injunction and its affirmance on appeal, Ms. Bogart and her co-coun-
sel had been engaged in monitoring the Department's compliance with the order.
Because LSC was not a party to this case, the opinion had no legal effect on the
appropriation provisions or the LSC regulations discussed in the court's opinion. In
addition, it should be noted that neither LSC nor the Justice Department filed briefs
in the case nor did any party present legal arguments contrary to those submitted by
Ms. Bogart's attorney. Finally, the court's analysis of the scope of the "safe harbor
provisions" of the final class action regulation is, in material respects, incorrect.
Under 45 C.F.R. § 1617.2(b)(2), recipients may represent individual clients to obtain
the benefit of relief order by a court in a class action and can engage in some non-
adversarial activities. See 45 C.F.R. § 1617.2(b)(2) (1998). Because the LSC con-
cluded that Ms. Bogart's activities fell within the "safe harbor provision," the judge's
opinion was advisory.
198. The LSC has interpreted the statutory provisions on drug-related evictions to
apply only to a tenant when that tenant has (1) been convicted, or has been charged
by a prosecuting authority, with the illegal sale or distribution of a controlled sub-
stance, and (2) the eviction proceeding is brought because the illegal drug activity of
that tenant threatens the health or safety of another tenant residing in the public
housing project or an employee of the agency. See 45 C.F.R § 1633.3.
199. See id. § 1612.6.
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In contrast to the one-time withdrawal problems that have been re-
solved, there are ongoing issues of withdrawal, particularly in cases
involving prisoners, aliens and, to a lesser extent, cases in which it may
be necessary to challenge a welfare reform law. The most common
problem involves the fact that the status of "clients" can easily change
from a non-prisoner to a prisoner and from an alien whose representa-
tion is permitted to an alien whose representation is not permitted.0 0
In addition, in a few welfare cases, recipients who originally believed
they could provide effective representation determine afterward that
they can not do so without violating the welfare reform prohibition.
Although representation could previously have been shifted to non-
LSC funds for alien and other types of cases, recipients can no longer
shift to non-LSC funds to carry on the representation because of the
"entity" restrictions.20 1 Generally, the LSC regulations require recipi-
ents who are facing status changes to take steps to discontinue repre-
sentation "consistent with applicable rules of professional
responsibility., 212
Model Rule 1.16 mandates withdrawal where representation has
commenced and "the representation will result in violation of the
rules of professional conduct or other law .. ,".3 Presumably, it
would be a violation of "other law" to continue representation in
cases where federal law prohibits the representation. 204 There are no
ABA opinions that directly address this issue, 20 5 although there are a
few state bar opinions that have concluded that federal law prohibit-
ing certain representation is considered "other law" under the ethical
rules.2 °6 In addition, the Model Rule provides for voluntary with-
200. The LSC has interpreted the prohibition on prisoner representation to address
the most common problem of individuals who are arrested and imprisoned for a short
period of time and then subsequently lose their status as prisoners. If "the period of
incarceration is anticipated to be brief and the litigation is likely to continue beyond
the period of incarceration[,]" then recipients do not have to take steps to withdraw.
45 C.F.R. § 1637.4. LSC provides as a guideline that brief incarceration is to be "in-
carceration which is expected to last less than 3 months." 62 Fed. Reg. 19,421, 19,422
(1997) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 1637).
201. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
202. 45 C.F.R. § 1626.9 (setting forth the provision on the changing circumstances
of aliens).
203. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.16(a)(1) (1998).
204. Perhaps the consequences would only mean that the entity loses its federal
funding. See supra Part II.B.
205. The "violation of other law" language has been applied in situations where the
client suggests a course of action that is illegal, and the attorney must withdraw to
avoid the illegality. There is little discussion of situations where a higher law directs
the lawyer to withdraw, as in the case of the 1996 restrictions on LSC-funded
recipients.
206. See, e.g., Response to Letter of Inquiry No. 98-25 from Michael D. McDowell,
Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Pennsylvania Bar Asso-
ciation, to Carolyn L. Carter, Esq. 3-4 (Mar. 19, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinaf-
ter Inquiry No. 98-25] (stating that in the Committee's opinion, complying with a
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drawal when "other good cause for withdrawal exists. ' 20 7 Prohibi-
tions of federal law on what types of cases may be represented appear
to provide "good cause" for wvithdrawal.
Nevertheless, "[w]hen ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall
continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating
the representation."20" Thus, mandatory and voluntary withdrawal is
subject to approval by a court or administrative tribunal before which
the case is pending. In such circumstances, the recipient must bring
the matter before the court or tribunal and seek withdrawal. If the
recipient is ordered to remain in the case, the recipient must do so, but
the recipient must also seek alternative counsel and take all other
steps necessary to withdraw in order to comply with the LSC regula-
tory requirements.
There has not yet been a confrontation between the LSC and its
recipients over withdrawal in ongoing matters when the client's status
changes or when effective representation of a client requires that the
recipient take action that would be prohibited under the new restric-
tions. If a confrontation arises, however, its resolution may depend on
the facts of the case. The LSC might pressure the recipient to with-
draw or provide the recipient with sufficient flexibility so that repre-
sentation may continue. For example, aliens who are no longer
present in the United States (as required by the appropriation provi-
sions) but who otherwise fit within the permissible categories for rep-
resentation, may be treated differently than aliens whose status
changes and who are no longer within the permissible categories.20 9
B. Issues Involving Confidentiality
A significant set of ethical issues posed by the restrictions involves
the lawyer's duty to preserve confidences and secrets as well as infor-
mation subject to the attorney-client privilege.
1. The Ethical Framework
Model Rule 1.6 prohibits a lawyer from revealing "information re-
lating to representation of a client unless the client consents after con-
sultation, except for disclosures that are implicitly authorized to carry
out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b)." 210 Par-
agraph (b) of Rule 1.16 contains the exceptions permitting disclosure
federal requirement to release information about clients does not contravene Model
Rule 1.6).
207. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.16(b)(6).
208. Id. Rule 1.16(c).
209. LSC has not determined the scope of the statutory and regulatory requirement
that aliens must "present in the United States" in order to be represented. 45 C.F.R.
§ 1626.5 (1998). LSC is likely to soon begin, however, a new rulemaking procedure
soon to determine how that phrase should be interpreted. See 63 Fed. Reg. 60,026,
60,026-27 (Nov. 6, 1998).
210. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6.
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to prevent a client from committing a criminal act, or to defend the
lawyer when in dispute with the client or in other matters concerning
the lawyer's representation.211
The Committee and several state bar committees have held that cli-
ent identities and addresses are a secret or confidence protected by
ethical rules against disclosing client confidences. 212 In 1969, the ques-
tion of revealing client identity arose in the context of a General Ac-
counting Office ("GAO") audit of a neighborhood legal services
office.213 The GAO requested to audit case fies to determine the
types of cases the office handled, the results the office obtained, and
whether the clients met income eligibility requirements. 214 The Com-
mittee concluded that review of the intake and case disposition forms
by the GAO for that purpose would not violate the ethics rules if no
information would be divulged that identified the client.215
The ABA directly addressed the issue again in June 1974.216 This
case arose in the context of a non-profit research group that sought to
obtain data on clients from an organization known as Legal Services
Offices. 217 The Committee concluded that:
the names, addresses and telephone numbers of clients of a Legal
Services Office are secret within the meaning of DR 4-101(A) ....
Accordingly, it would be in violation of DR 4-101(B) for the
Legal Services Office either to grant access to the records to the
outside research group to select the random sampling of clients or
to release the names, addresses, and phone numbers so that the
outside research group could seek consent to interview the
clients.2 1 s
Thus, the ABA clearly found that revealing the identities of legal serv-
ices clients was unethical.
211. See id. Rule 1.16(b).
212. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1081 (1969) (find-
ing that attorneys should not divulge information that would identify the client); Ari-
zona State Bar, Op. No. 81-4 (1981) (authorizing legal services to release information
upon the request of the governing board, but barred release of client secrets without
consent); Committee on Legal Ethics, D.C. Bar, Op. No. 124 (1983) (holding that an
attorney must protect the identity of clients, unless ordered to disclose the identity by
a court order); Kentucky Bar Ass'n, Op. E-253 (1981) (allowing disclosure of infor-
mation only if the client has authorized the release, there is no expectation of confi-
dentiality on the part of the client, or the information is in the public record because
of the attorney's representation of the client); Mississippi State Bar, Op. No. 101
(1985) (stating that attorneys need not disclose client information as required by fed-
erally funded corporations).










The issue was indirectly considered again in Informal Opinion
1394.219 This opinion concerned requirements of a contract between a
statewide agency and the local legal services offices; the contract spec-
ified records the local office had to keep and make available to state
agency monitors? °20 The Committee cited Informal Opinion 1081 21
with approval and concluded that DR 4-101 prevented inspectors
from examining files relating to client matters when they contain con-
fidences and secrets, and when the client has not knowingly waived
confidentiality.' m "We perceive nothing in the Code that makes the
professional obligations inapplicable to a lawyer employed by a legal
services agency wholly or partly supported by public funds or that ex-
cludes a non-fee-paying client from the protection or benefit of those
professional obligations. '
In Formal Opinion 334, the Committee considered questions arising
from legal services audits." 4 It held that the board of directors of a
legal services office could require staff attorneys to provide informa-
tion that was reasonably necessary to determine if the board's policies
were being carried out.'2 But the opinion issued a caveat: "Proce-
dures to preserve the anonymity of the client approved in Informal
Opinions 1081 and 1287 should be followed."" 6
Finally, the Committee again dealt with questions about legal serv-
ices audits, and decided in Informal Opinion 1443 that audit by in-
dependent accountants of receipts and disbursements of client trust
funds was proper. 7 Nevertheless, the opinion held that the Code's
prohibition of client secrets still applied, and that legal services law-
yers still had an obligation to preserve client anonymity.2 There is
no reason to suppose that Model Rule 1.6 relaxes that protection in
any way. Model Rule 1.6 is more stringent than the prior Code provi-
sions. It abandoned DR 4-101(A)'s definition of "secret," and draws
within its protections all information communicated to a lawyer by or
about a client that is not specifically excepted. 9 Rule 1.6 prohibits
219. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1394
(1977).
220. See id.
221. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1081 (1969).
222. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. No.
1394 (1977).
223. Id.




227. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op.
1443 (1979).
228. See id.
229. Compare Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101(A) (1981)
(prohibiting communication of client secrets or confidences), with Model Rules of




lawyers from revealing information "relating to representation of a
client. 12 3° The term "relates" is broad, and has been defined as "to
show or establish a logical or causal connection between. '231 Virtually
all information that clients give to an attorney, including names and
addresses, has "connection, relation, or reference" to representation.
In Formal Opinion 96-399, the Committee specifically held that Model
Rule 1.6 prohibits revealing client identity and information relating to
representation without the client's consent, unless disclosure is implic-
itly authorized in order to carry out the representation. 32
Model Rule 1.6 differs from previous ethical rules by foregoing an
exception when law requires disclosure. Many states have restored
the "required by law" exception, 3 and the commentary to the Model
Rules notes that "a lawyer may be obligated or permitted by other
provisions of law to give information about a client. 2 34 Whether an-
other provision of law supersedes Model Rule 1.6 is a matter of inter-
pretation beyond the scope of the Rules, but a "presumption should
exist against such a supersession." 5 Moreover, section 115 of the
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers provides that a "lawyer
may use or disclose confidential client information when required by
law, after the lawyer takes reasonably appropriate steps to assert that
the information is privileged or otherwise protected against
disclosure."23 6
2. Client Identity and Statements of Facts
As noted above, the 1996 restrictions required recipients to identify
potential client-plaintiffs by name and to obtain a written statement of
facts from any client-plaintiff before the attorney may engage in pre-
complaint settlement negotiations or file suit on the client's behalf.2 37
This requirement could have posed ethical dilemmas for recipients
and attorneys under Model Rule 1.6 if it had been interpreted to: (1)
apply to existing cases as opposed to new cases; (2) exceed existing
standards for proceeding anonymously; or (3) disclose facts that went
beyond the factual disclosures that were included in any complaint
that was filed.
230. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6.
231. Webster's New International Dictionary 1916 (3d ed. 1986).
232. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. No.
96-399 (1996).
233. See 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering
§ AP4:103 (2d ed. 1998).
234. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 cmt. 21.
235. Id.
236. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 115 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996).
237. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-134, § 504(a)(8), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-53; 45 C.F.R. § 1636 (1998).
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Formal Opinion 96-399 raised these issues. The LSC, however, in-
terpreted the requirement to apply only to new cases. In addition, the
LSC interpreted the client identity provisions consistent with existing
standards for proceeding anonymously. This obviated recommenda-
tions made in the opinion regarding advice to clients to proceed
without representation by a legal services lawyer, to decline represen-
tation, or to seek consent for disclosure of a client's name. Finally, the
requirement for a written statement of facts was interpreted to require
little more than a signed, written statement of the facts necessary to
file a complaint. Therefore, it did not necessarily require the inclusion
of information that went beyond the factual disclosures that are im-
plicitly authorized to carry out the representation. Experience with
the regulation has not produced situations where recipients were re-
quired to violate ethical requirements to comply with the provisions of
section 1636.
3. Case Disclosure Requirements
The 1998 provisions" require LSC recipients in cases the recipients
initiate to disclose to the LSC and the general public the names and
addresses of all parties, the cause of action, the case number, and ad-
dress of the court in which the case was filed.239 Attorneys who dis-
close this information may face ethical dilemmas if they disclose to
third parties client identities that are not otherwise disclosed in the
normal course of representation, or if they disclose client identities or
addresses in cases where such information is not disclosed in court
papers, such as domestic violence cases. The LSC's interpretation of
the disclosure requirement took great care to provide a framework for
compliance with the requirement in a manner that did not require dis-
closure of client confidences and would not subject the client to physi-
cal harm.24 Under the LSC interpretation, the requirement only
applies to new cases after January 1, 1998241 that were filed "on behalf
of a client of [a] recipient. '242 If recipients represent a defendant,
they did not have to disclose the names and addresses of their clients.
Moreover, if the case or matter were filed in an administrative adjudi-
catory proceeding, disclosure is not required until an appeal was filed
in court. In addition, recipients do not have to provide the names and
addresses of plaintiffs if the information is protected by an order or
rule of any court or by state or federal law or if the recipient attorney
"reasonably believes that revealing such information would put the
client of the recipient at risk of physical harm .... ,43 This exception
238. See 45 C.F.R. § 1644.1-.4 (1997).




243. Id. § 1644.4(a)(1)(ii).
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particularly focused on clients subject to domestic violence, but was
written broadly to protect all clients who face a risk of physical harm,
including family members.
One state bar ethical opinion interpreted this section to mean that
the legal services recipient could provide this information without run-
ning afoul of the ethical proscriptions against disclosure of confiden-
tial information because, under the ethical rules of the state,
disclosure was permissible if required by law.2 44 This provides little
solace to the zealous advocate and the client because it does not ad-
dress the fundamental concern that the statute's disclosure require-
ments undermine the effectiveness of other law without any apparent
countervailing utility.
4. Access to Records by LSC or Other Monitors or Auditors
The new procedural and reporting requirements discussed above
have received the most attention from ABA and state bar associa-
tions, but the most critical federal legislative change regarding client
confidentiality in the 1996 appropriations provisions involves access
by the LSC to client information contained in recipient records. LSC
auditors and monitors, as well as other government auditors and
monitors, were given explicit access to financial records, time records,
retainer agreements, client trust fund and eligibility records, and client
names, except for reports or records subject to the attorney-client
privilege.245 Prior to the 1996 provisions, LSC access to client infor-
mation was protected by a provision in the LSC Act that prohibited
LSC from interfering with an attorney in carrying out his or her pro-
fessional responsibilities, and required LSC to "ensure that activities
under ... [the LSC Act] are carried out in a manner consistent with
attorneys' professional responsibilities. 24 6 In addition, the access-to-
records provisions in the LSC Act protect against disclosure of
244. See Inquiry No. 98-25, supra note 206, at 3-4.
245. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-134, § 509(h), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-60. The act provides:
Notwithstanding section 1006(b)(3) of the Legal Services Corporation Act
(42 U.S.C. 2996e(b)(3)), financial records, time records, retainer agreements,
client trust fund and eligibility records, and client names, for each recipient
shall be made available to any auditor or monitor of the recipient, including
any Federal department or agency that is auditing or monitoring the activi-
ties of the Corporation or of the recipient, and any independent auditor or
monitor receiving Federal funds to conduct such auditing or monitoring, in-
cluding any auditor or monitor of the Corporation, except for reports or
records subject to the attorney-client privilege.
Id. § 509(h), 110 Stat. at 1321-60.
246. 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(b)(3) (1994).
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records or reports that contain information subject to the attorney-
client privilege.247
This new access provision poses a fundamental question: whether
compliance with federal law that requires access to information such
as client names, retainer agreements, client trust-fund records, and eli-
gibility records places the recipient and its attorneys in an ethical di-
lemma. Sometimes, as in the case of financial and timekeeping
records, client names and confidential information may be safe-
guarded through the use of codes. Documents such as retainer agree-
ments, client trust funds, and eligibility records, however, will almost
certainly include client names and other information that is probably
covered by state ethical rules on confidentiality. 248 The LSC Inspector
General sought this new requirement to ensure that LSC monitors,
auditors, and the Comptroller General would have access to this infor-
mation, and that state ethical rules could not bar them from such ac-
cess.2 49 LSC has interpreted the new provision as an absolute access
requirement without exception. 50
a. Ethical Rules
In states that have adopted a clear "required by law" exception, it is
likely that the ethical rules will be interpreted to permit access to such
records and client names without conflicting with the ethical rules. "
In states without the "required by law" exception, however, it is not
clear whether the state bar ethics committee would read such an ex-
ception into the ethical rules as has been done in other contexts, or
whether it would find that such information could not be disclosed
under that state's ethical rules. It is not likely, however, that legal
services lawyers would face ethical sanctions for disclosing informa-
tion required by federal law in those states that do not explicitly or
implicitly incorporate the "required by law" exception.s 2 Even so,
the access provision does pose a fundamental conflict between the
247. See id § 2996h(d) (providing that "neither the Corporation nor the Comptrol-
ler General shall have access to any reports or records subject to the attorney-client
privilege").
248. See, e.g., Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 cmt. (1996) ("The
confidentiality rule applies not merely to matters communicated in confidence by the
client but also to all information relating to the representation, whatever its source.").
249. See Letter from Edouard Quatrevaux, Legal Services Corporation Inspector
General, to the Honorable Harold Rogers, Chairman, and the Honorable Alan B.
Mollohan, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State,
The Judiciary and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, United States
House of Representatives 2-3 (Nov. 20, 1995) (on file with author).
250. See Access to Audit Working Papers, 61 Fed. Reg. 54,821, § II-1.F (Oct. 22,
1996) (providing Audit Guides for LSC Recipients and Auditors).
251. See 2 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 233, § AP4:103; Inquiry No. 98-25, supra
note 206, at 3-4.
252. See 2 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 233, § AP4:105.
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new federal law and state ethical rules protecting confidential client
information.
b. Attorney-Client Privilege
Under the LSC 1996 access-to-records provisions and the LSC Act's
access-to-records provisions, information protected by the attorney-
client privilege cannot be accessed by the LSC or other government
monitors and auditors. These exceptions are curious because the at-
torney-client privilege is an evidentiary privilege that applies in judi-
cial and other proceedings in which a lawyer appears as a witness or is
otherwise required to produce information concerning a client. If the
information provided to the recipient by a client would be covered by
the attorney-client privilege, however, then such information cannot
be revealed to LSC monitors or auditors, and LSC cannot seek and
force access to such information.
There may be information in retainer agreements and client eligibil-
ity records that are covered by the attorney-client privilege, which can
be protected through redaction. In legal services practice, retainer
agreements and client-eligibility records often do not contain privi-
leged information, although such records virtually always contain in-
formation protected by the broader ethical rules. The most difficult
problem for LSC recipients has been whether the attorney-client priv-
ilege protects clients' names and whether the LSC may access client
names without client consent.
The general rule is that client identity is not protected under the
evidentiary privilege. The most commonly cited case for this proposi-
tion is United States v. Pape.253 The Pape case and its progeny 54 fo-
cus, however, on the idea that the privilege protects communications
made in the context of the professional relationship, not the profes-
sional relationship itself.2 " Two intertwining principles in the Pape
line of cases are: (1) that a balancing of competing interests to evalu-
ate the coverage of the privilege is necessary, 6 and (2) that the litiga-
tion context in which the requests for client identity and address have
arisen is an essential component of that balancing consideration. 57
Since the privilege results in the exclusion of evidence it runs
counter to the widely held view that the fullest disclosure of the
facts will best lead to the truth and ultimately to the triumph of
253. 144 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1944).
254. See, e.g., Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 632 (9th Cir. 1960) ("If the identifica-
tion of the client conveys information which ordinarily would be conceded to be part
of the usual privileged communication between attorney and client, then the privilege
should extend to such identification in the absence of other factors.").
255. See Pape, 144 F.2d. at 782.
256. See Behrens v. Hironimus, 170 F.2d 627, 628 (4th Cir. 1948).
257. See R. M. Weddle, Annotation, Disclosure of Name, Identity, Address, Occu-




justice. In reconciling these conflicting principles, the courts have
pointed out that since the policy of full disclosure is the more funda-
mental one, the privilege is not to be viewed as absolute and is to be
strictly limited to the purpose for which it exists. 58
In those cases, the need for a full factual disclosure to facilitate the
"triumph of justice" 9 (the competing interest) outweighs the client's
request for confidentiality of his or her identity because the client is in
an adversary position as the subject of criminal investigation or as a
party in a civil lawsuit.
[T]he opposing party has a right to know with whom he is contend-
ing or who the real party in interest is, if not the nominal adver-
sary.... [O]ther-wise, it is felt, attorneys might conceal a multitude
of information under the claim of privilege, without having to show
that the alleged client ever, in fact, existed.2 0
This rationale for the client-identity exception to the privilege is ex-
plained by Wigmore as springing from the client's own use of the pub-
lic legal forum:
The identity of the attorney's client or the name of the real party in
interest will seldom be a matter communicated in confidence be-
cause the procedure of litigation ordinarily presupposes a disclosure
of these facts.... [T]he privilege cannot be used to evade a client's
responsibility for the use of legal process.26'
The names and addresses of legal services clients in litigation are pub-
lic records, and recipients should be able to provide these to LSC and
other government monitors and auditors. This exception to the privi-
lege may not, however, directly relate to the issue of client identity
and address when legal services clients are not in litigation. As Wig-
more states, "much ought to depend upon the circumstances of each
case."'262 In the daily legal services context, the balancing of compet-
ing interests is a very different matter and may require a different out-
come from that of the Pape cases: client names should be protected
by the privilege.
Two court-created exceptions to the client identity rule under the
privilege illustrate how a change in the competing interests will result
in courts ruling that the privilege protects client identity. Most com-
monly, the courts protect client identity when so much information
has already been disclosed about the client that to reveal the client's




261. 8 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence § 2313 (1961) (emphasis omitted).
262. Id.
263. See Weddle, supra note 257, at 1053-54; see also NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d
900, 905 (4th Cir. 1965) (acknowledging that the identity of the client should not be
disclosed where disclosure would result in the disclosure of confidential communica-
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Stolowitz v. Stolowitz,26 a case which is closer to the LSC situation,
the plaintiff in a matrimonial litigation sought to discover client lists of
the opposing spouse so that those clients could be contacted and inter-
viewed about their fee arrangements with the opposing spouse.265
The clients whose identities were sought were not parties to the litiga-
tion, nor did they have a stake in its outcome. The court noted that
the opposing spouse was already willing to cooperate in providing in-
formation to the plaintiff about his business interests and that the
plaintiff failed to show any other special circumstances and need to
know actual client identity. Without such countervailing special inter-
ests, the court held the privilege protected client lists.
2 66
No court has squarely addressed whether client names are pro-
tected by disclosure to the LSC under the attorney-client privilege in
circumstances where the names have not been disclosed publicly. It is
not clear how a court would rule in any particular circumstance. The
LSC will likely insist, however, that it may access client names under
§ 509(h) and will likely take appropriate administrative action when
recipients refuse to provide such access.
5. Local Recipient Auditor Access to Records
A final confidentiality issue involves the new monitoring approach
developed by the LSC. It relies on independent public accountants
("IPAs") hired by the LSC recipient to audit the recipient. Following
the general procedures used by the federal government in auditing
non-profit organizations that receive federal grants and contracts, 2 6
IPAs examine a sample of the recipient's case files of the recipient to
determine whether it is in compliance. The IPA must "be provided
access to all records of the recipient the IPA reasonably believes to be
necessary to the performance of the audit. '2 68 In addition, the LSC
Compliance Supplement specifically requires that auditors "select a
representative sample of case files" to assess compliance with most of
the LSC regulations.2 69 Recipients may not redact information in
those case files. As explained by the LSC, "[i]t is axiomatic that IPAs
cannot conduct an adequate audit if unable to obtain sufficient docu-
mentation regarding compliance with the requirements to be audited.
tion); Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 631-32 (9th Cir. 1960) (holding that an attorney
cannot be forced to reveal the name of his client when the client employed the attor-
ney to voluntarily mail tax payments to the government).
264. 435 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
265. See id. at 883.
266. See id. at 886.
267. See Audits of States, Local Governments, and Non-Profit Organizations, 62
Fed. Reg. 35,278 (1997).
268. Audit Guide for LSC Recipients and Auditors, 61 Fed. Reg. 54,816, 54,821
(1996).
269. Legal Services Corp., Appendix A: Compliance Supplement for Audits of
LSC Recipients 10 (1997).
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Access to such documentation should not be impeded as it is well es-
tablished that recipient IPAs in conducting audits are within the attor-
ney-client privilege. 270
The ABA addressed the question of whether local IPAs could audit
client trust fund accounts as follows:
We conclude that a legal services program may properly employ an
independent accountant, chosen with reasonable care, to examine
and audit the program's records of receipts and disbursements of
client trust funds, if the independent account undertakes confidenti-
ality in the handling of the information.
In reaching our opinion, we assume that neither the independent
accountant nor the local program reveals to the program's funding
source or other third party any information that identifies a particu-
lar client or that otherwise is a confidence or secret of a client.271
The ABA's gloss on its Informal Opinion No. 1443 is misleading and
perhaps mistaken. The Informal Opinion does not address whether
the outside auditor is within the attorney-client privilege, although
perhaps that conclusion is implicit. It only addresses whether a recipi-
ent would violate client confidences and secrets if it employed an IPA
to examine client trust fund financial records.
During the first two years of the new monitoring and auditing
scheme employed by the LSC, there has been no significant dispute
between the LSC and its recipients over access to client files by
IPAs.272 This issue, however, did surface in one recent special audit of
a local recipient IPA by the Office of Inspector General, although, to
the satisfaction of LSC and the recipient, the issue was resolved. 217
If IPAs cannot freely access client files, the entire monitoring
scheme currently being used by LSC and required by section 509 of
the 1996 provisions would be placed in jeopardy. 4 It is unlikely that
Congress will permit this congressionally mandated monitoring
scheme to be impeded by recipients who refuse to give their IPAs un-
restricted access to case files.275
270. Audit Guide for LSC Recipients and Auditors, 61 Fed. Reg. 54,816, 54,817
(Oct. 22, 1996).
271. Letter from Sherman S. Welpron, Jr., Chairman, American Bar Association, to
Dan J. Bradley, Legal Services Corporation (Dec. 10, 1979) (on file with author).
272. See Interview with Linda Perle, Senior Staff Attorney, Center for Law and
Social Policy, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 10, 1998). Ms. Perle tracks LSC recipients
interaction with the Office of the Inspector General and provides representation to
recipients who have disputes with LSC.
273. See id.
274. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-134, § 509, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-58 to -59.
275. LSC has requested that Congress clarify this issue in the fiscal year 1999 ap-
propriations legislation by providing for unrestricted access by IPAs to recipient case
files. See Memorandum from Dom Gillivan to Jennifer Mitter (September 14, 1998)
(on file with author). Congress did not act on this request in the fiscal year 1999
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C. Issues Raised by Formal Opinion 96-399
As noted previously, in early 1996, the Committee issued an advi-
sory ethical opinion. Formal Opinion 96-399, which addressed a series
of ethical issues that the Committee anticipated legal services recipi-
ents receiving funding from the Legal Services Corporation would
face upon enactment of the 1996 appropriations legislation.
1. Funding Reductions and Restrictive Conditions
In preparing 96-399, the Committee assumed that (1) the funding
reductions which recipients face would require them to severely re-
duce service to existing clients, (2) the prospective restrictive condi-
tions would severely impede competent and high quality legal
representation of significant numbers of existing and future clients,
and (3) both funding reductions and restrictions would require them
to withdraw from ongoing representation in a large number of
cases.2 76 These may have been reasonable assumptions in 1995, but
such consequences did not arise in actual practice.
a. Impact of Funding Reductions
Legal services recipients that deliver legal services directly to the
poor have, on average, experienced a funding reduction of approxi-
mately 25% in 1996 and 1997.277 For many recipients, the reduction of
that magnitude has forced them to close offices and reduce staff.27 8
For recipients that have significant non-LSC funding, however, the im-
pact required only staff reductions.2 79 According to the available data
gathered since the funding reductions were effected, LSC-funded re-
cipients responded in a variety of ways to the funding reductions.281'
Funding reductions adversely impacted the ongoing representation of
clients in only a few cases. Most recipients limited intake of new ap-
plicants but continued representing virtually all existing clients, except
for those for whom representation could no longer be pursued under
the prohibitions on class actions, welfare reform cases, and represen-
tation of certain aliens and prisoners.
appropriation bill. See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appro-
priations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, tit. V, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-107 (1998).
276. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-
399.
277. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
279. See infra note 280.
280. The author has tracked recipient and former recipient activities as part of his
role in the Project for the Future of Equal Justice, a joint project of the Center for
Law and Social Policy and the National Legal Aid and Defender Association. See also
SPAN Detailed Information by State, 3 SPAN Update: A Guide to Legal Services




To discuss the impact of the new restrictions on legal services repre-
sentation, 96-399 assumed the "worst case" scenario. Even though 96-
399 purported to forego interpreting the restrictions, its analysis and
logic are premised on a number of interpretations that did not accord
with the text of the proposed statutory language or its legislative his-
tory, and were inconsistent with interpretations of the restrictions that
LSC adopted."s As a result, 96-399 inadvertently addressed issues
not in dispute and suggested solutions to problems that did not exist
or were overstated.
For example, the appropriations legislation does not include a
broad fee-generating case restriction even though it was cited in 96-
399. 2 While such a restriction appeared in both the House and Sen-
ate bills, it was neither included in the Conference Bill -Z nor the Om-
nibus Appropriations Bill that was enacted.' The fiscal year 1997
and 1998 appropriation provisions included new fee-generating case
restrictions.2s5
The author has previously estimated that more than 95% of the cli-
ents currently represented by legal services organizations can and will
continue to be fully represented, and at least 90% (and probably as
high as 95%) of the activity that is now permissible remains permissi-
ble under the new restrictions because the fee-generating case restric-
tion is not included in the fiscal year 1996 appropriation restrictions
and because a number of interpretations suggested by 96-399 have not
been adopted.2 6 For example, most aliens represented by recipients
can still be represented because they fit into one of the exceptions to
the restriction on alien representation. Few recipients represent sig-
nificant numbers of prisoners. There have been only a handful of
public housing drug eviction cases that meet the statutory criteria. s
Only a few matters require a class action in order "to assert the cli-
281. The interpretations of these restrictions are best left to LSC, which has the
legal duty to provide guidance to recipients about what the restrictions require, deter-
mine which clients the recipient may not represent, and how recipients of LSC funds
should respond to situations that involve ongoing representation of clients or contin-
ued participation in cases that are restricted. LSC has now finalized regulations inter-
preting the 1996 and 1997 appropriation restrictions.
282. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-134, 100 Stat. 1321; ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibil-
ity, Formal Op. 96-399.
283. See H.R. 2076, 104th Cong. (1995) (enacted).
284. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, 110
Stat. 1321.
285. See An Act Making Omnibus Appropriations for the Fiscal Year Ending Sep-
tember 30, 1997, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
286. See Houseman, Address, supra note 7, at 290.
287. LSC has interpreted the statutory provisions on drug-related evictions to apply
only to a tenant when that tenant has (1) been convicted, or has been charged by a
prosecuting authority, with the illegal sale or distribution of a controlled substance
and (2) the eviction proceeding is brought because the illegal drug activity of that
1999] 2233
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
ent's rights effectively." Most income maintenance cases will not in-
volve welfare reform, and most income maintenance cases that do will
fall within the exception for "representing an individual [who] is seek-
ing specific relief from a welfare agency that does not involve an effort
to amend or otherwise challenge existing law. '288 Finally, Formal
Opinion 96-399 does not track the actual language of the fiscal year
1996 appropriations legislation and includes statements that are inac-
curate or do not fully explain the restriction. 8 9
2. Notice Requirements and the Obligation to Prepare and Plan
The notice provisions of Formal Opinion 96-399 require legal serv-
ices recipients and attorneys to provide to existing and new clients
information which is not necessary because most existing and new cli-
ents will be unaffected by the restrictions.
a. Notice to All Clients of Possible Funding
Reductions and Restrictions
Formal Opinion 96-399 required a legal services lawyer to
give all clients adequate notice of the impending changes ... and
how they may affect the clients' representations .... This is true
whether the lawyer anticipates being able to continue the represen-
tation, or whether he anticipates having to limit the scope of the
representation, to refer the matter to alternative counsel, or to
withdraw.2 90
Model Rule 1.4 does not require that a legal services lawyer or pro-
gram give notice to clients who would not be affected at all by funding
tenant threatens the health or safety of another tenant residing in the public housing
project or an employee of the agency. See 45 C.F.R. § 1633.3 (1998).
288. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-134, § 504(a)(16), 110 Stat. 1321, 1355-56; see 45 C.F.R. § 1639.4.
289. For example, Formal Opinion 96-399 states that recipients cannot undertake
"representation challenging the LSC, its conduct or oversight proceedings, or that of
any LSC grantee." ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 96-399 (1996). This statement is somewhat misleading. Section 506 of Pub. L.
104-134 prohibits recipients from using LSC funds (but not non-LSC funds) to sue
LSC. See § 506, 110 Stat. at 1321-57. Section 504(a)(5) prohibits recipients from lob-
bying on oversight proceedings affecting LSC, but section 504(b) permits the use on
non-LSC funds to contact, communicate with and respond to a request of a state or
local legislative body about oversight proceedings affecting a recipient. See § 504, 110
Stat. at 1321-53 to -57. In another example, Formal Opinion 96-399 states that recipi-
ents cannot undertake "representation with regard to administrative policy at any
level of government." ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 96-399. Sections 504(a)(2) and (3), however, prohibit only rulemaking activity by
recipients. Representation in agency hearings that adjudicate the rights of individual
beneficiaries (e.g., welfare, Social Security, SSI hearings) is not prohibited and can
result in challenges to agency policy on behalf of an individual client. See 45 C.F.R.
§ 1612.5(a).




reductions or by potential restrictions on the scope of practice. 9'
Moreover, imposing such a requirement would burden legal services
unnecessarily and confuse clients about what will and will not happen
to their pending cases and ongoing representation. At most, the no-
tice requirements should only apply to those clients who would likely
be affected.
In addition, the opinion's advice that addressed which staff mem-
bers should return telephone calls from affected clients is not helpful.
This is a matter best left to the legal services recipient to determine
and does not appear related to the notice that may be required by
Rule 1.4.29
b. Obtaining Alternative Funding and Representation
The opinion discusses the need for LSC recipients to obtain alterna-
tive funding and representation, but exaggerates the problems that
legal services faced in finding alternative counsel because of its inac-
curate assumptions. This is not to say that some recipients did not
face problems in finding alternative counsel. For example, in note 6,
the opinion referenced a newspaper article describing representation
by New Hampshire Legal Assistance of the 2000 inmates in the pris-
oner class action but failed to mention that New Hampshire Legal
Assistance gave up its LSC funds and continued its representation in
the case.
2 9 3
The opinion also suggests that there may be an ethical obligation
"to determine whether there is a basis for securing a different inter-
pretation of restrictive legislative language ' 294 when seeking to with-
draw from representation. It is not clear on what basis such an ethical
requirement arises, although it may be argued that it is appropriate to
seek a narrower construction so that withdrawal is not necessary.295
291. Rule 1.4 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides:
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.4 (1998).
292. Throughout, Formal Opinion 96-399 makes practice suggestions which do not
seem to be required by ethical rules, even though they may constitute thoughtful ad-
vice and good recipient practices. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Re-
sponsibility, Formal Op. 96-399. For example, the opinion suggests which staff
members should return phone calls and recommends implementation of screening
procedures for new representation to ensure that violation of law will not occur. See
id. Such practical advice is best left to the LSC recipient to determine.
293. Compare idL (describing the representation), with Telephone Interview with
Robert Gross, Director, New Hampshire Legal Assistance (January 10, 1996) (re-
vealing that New Hampshire Legal Assistance gave up its LSC funding).
294. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. No. 96-
399.




Formal Opinion 96-399 does not, however, consider the practical
problems that varying court interpretations of a restriction would pose
for both the recipients and the LSC. While this sentence was included
to encourage narrow interpretations of the restrictions, nevertheless,
under the LSC Act,296 the responsibility for interpreting the restric-
tions initially rests with LSC and not individual lawyers or various
courts that may be faced with motions to withdraw because of the new
restrictions.297
3. Duties to Clients Whose Representation Will Be Prohibited by
Acceptance of LSC Funding
The opinion suggests that "each legal services office will have to
make its own determination" about foregoing LSC funding or with-
drawing from prohibited matters.298 In actual practice, the legal serv-
ices recipient, through its board and management, not each legal
services office, will have to make this decision.
There is a more basic issue on withdrawal under Model Rule 1.16
that was not addressed by the opinion. The discussion of withdrawal,
including note 10, concludes that withdrawal may be necessary for cli-
ents who become ineligible or in cases that become restricted to serve
other existing clients, but Formal Opinion 96-399 does so without
mentioning the provision in Rule 1.16 that states withdrawal may be
mandatory when "required by law." As argued above,2 99 the require-
ments imposed by federal law are included in the Rule's mandatory
withdrawal provisions when "required by law." If continued repre-
sentation in a case requires the attorney to violate the restrictions in
an appropriations act, then withdrawal is "required by law."
296. Courts are specifically prohibited from questioning whether representation by
LSC recipients is authorized in a case or matter before the court, and places the re-
sponsibility on LSC for interpreting the LSC Act when adverse parties challenge the
representation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(b)(1)(B) (1994).
297. There have been two major court challenges to the LSC restrictions. To date,
the results have been generally unsuccessful. See Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 985
F. Supp. 323, 344 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (denying plaintiffs' preliminary injunction motion),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 164 F.3d 757, 773 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that § 504(a)(16)
of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996 was uncon-
stitutional, and affirming on all other points of law the district court's denial of the
plaintiff's preliminary injunction motion); Legal Aid Soc'y v. Legal Servs. Corp., 981
F. Supp. 1288, 1301 (D. Haw. 1997) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to LSC fund-
ing restrictions), af)d in part, vacated in part, 145 F.3d 1017, 1031 (9th Cir.) (affirming
the district court's First Amendment holding, but reversing the district court's holding
that the LSC restrictions did not violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clause
rights of indigents), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 539 (1998).
298. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-399
(1996).
299. See supra note 205-09 and accompanying text.
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4. Obligations to Remaining Clients If the Recipient Decides to
Remain a LSC Recipient
The most serious concerns with Formal Opinion 96-399 lie with the
analysis and notice requirements regarding duties to existing clients.
a. Notice About Changes in Eligibility
Formal Opinion 96-399 requires that a legal services lawyer
must notify clients that circumstances such as incarceration or a
change in immigration status will likely make them ineligible for
further legal services, and thus result in a termination of legal serv-
ices. The lawyer should also request that clients keep her apprised
of any changes that might affect their eligibility.3 °°
This notice requirement does not appear to be necessary to address
the problems raised by the restrictions on eligibility based on alienage
or incarceration, nor does it appear that such a notice requirement
flows from the text or commentary to Rule 1.4.
This notice requirement is unjustified and unnecessary because of
additional congressionally mandated eligibility requirements that will
affect a few of recipients' clients. Such a requirement will, however,
have a potentially negative impact on the attorney-client relationship.
A written notice advising that eligibility for continued representation
requires them to stay out of jail would insult many clients. Only a few
clients will be affected by changes in eligibility arising from long-term
incarceration or changes in alien status.30 ' According to information
available to the author, who advises LSC recipients about compliance
with LSC regulations, far fewer clients have been affected by changes
in circumstances than those whose financial eligibility changes during
the course of legal services representation and to whom no notice has
been or currently is required.
LSC-funded recipients have always faced financial eligibility restric-
tions and, since 1983, have faced additional restrictions on represent-
ing aliens. The procedures set out by LSC in regulations regarding
financial eligibility and those regarding changes in alien status have
worked well in the past.302 They require the recipient to operate con-
sistent with attorney's ethical responsibilities. LSC has adopted simi-
lar procedures to address changes in eligibility due to incarceration or
changes in alien status. 3
300. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-399.
301. See 45 C.F.R. § 1637.3-.4 (1998).
302. See 45 C.F.R. § 1611.9 (1998) (financial eligibility); id. § 1626.7 (changes in
alien status).
303. See id. § 1637.4; id. § 1626.9.
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b. Limitations on the Scope of Representation
(1) Notice of Practice Restrictions and Written Agreement to
Abide for All Clients
The opinion states that "a legal services lawyer who accepts LSC
funding should inform all clients of the accompanying practice restric-
tions and obtain their written agreement to abide by those restrictions,
even if it does not appear likely that a particular representation will
run afoul of those restrictions." 3" Notice has never been required for
current eligibility restrictions, and there is no justification that such a
notice should be required for new restrictions. This notice and con-
sent requirement would be imposed on recfpients and attorneys with
respect to all clients, even if there were no realistic possibility that the
representation would be affected in any way by possible restrictions
on the scope of practice. Model Rule 1.2, limiting the scope of repre-
sentation "if the client consents after consultation," however, does not
suggest that lawyers must obtain consent from a client when there is
no practical likelihood that the restrictions on representation will af-
fect that particular client. In fact, no prior ABA opinion has sug-
gested that such notice and written consent was necessary for clients
who were not likely to be affected by restrictions on eligibility for
services.
(2) Client Consent to Limitations
The discussion in Formal Opinion 96-399 that requires client con-
sent to limitations on the scope of representation appears to create a
three-tiered system. First, "where it may fairly be anticipated that the
funding restrictions will sooner or later be implicated," the opinion
requires that the legal services lawyer either advise the client to seek
another lawyer or consider withdrawing from further representa-
tion.3"5 Second, when "there is only a small chance that practice re-
strictions will adversely affect a representation in the future," the
opinion requires that the legal services lawyer seek consent prospec-
tively on the scope of the representation. °6 Finally, the opinion re-
quires that "a legal services lawyer who accepts LSC funding should
inform all clients of the accompanying practice restrictions and obtain
their written agreement to abide by those restrictions, even if it does
not appear likely that a particular representation will run afoul of
those restrictions. 30 7
The requirement to obtain written agreement and consent for all
applicants for service will impose a significant and unnecessary admin-
istrative burden on legal services recipients. Moreover, requiring a






lengthy recitation of what the recipient cannot do has a potentially
negative and damaging effect on the attorney-client relationship. As
argued above, the current rules regarding limitations on the scope of
representation are entirely adequate to address the problems that will
arise from the addition of the new limitations on eligibility.
The opinion could also be read to impose greater burdens on a legal
services lawyer than on other members of the bar. Surely the Com-
mittee did not mean to suggest that all lawyers at the time of engage-
ment will be required to inform potential clients of all possible issues
which might subsequently require the lawyer to withdraw as counsel,
including the inability of the client to pay attorneys' fees, the possibil-
ity that a currently unknown conflict of interest may arise, or the lack
of full candor or disclosure by the client.
Thus, ethical rules do not require legal services lawyers to seek cli-
ent consent to the restrictions, except in the circumstance when the
restrictions may reasonably be expected to affect representation. Sim-
ilarly unnecessary is the requirement that legal services lawyers in-
form all clients of the practice restrictions and obtain written
agreements from all clients to abide by those restrictions.
5. Obligation to Non-clients
The opinion implies and specifies an ethical obligation to non-
clients.308 For example, Formal Opinion 96-399 discusses setting pri-
orities for serving existing clients and then suggests that there is an
ethical obligation to consider "material adversity that will befall par-
ticular clients who are not served, and the particular problems faced
by indigent people generally in each locality. ''3 9 Similarly, the opin-
ion suggests that in deciding whether to continue to represent existing
clients, who become ineligible after beginning representation, the law-
yer should take into account "the interests of other clients who would
go unrepresented if LSC funding is lost." 310 Likewise, Formal Opin-
ion 96-399 suggests that only in "extreme cases" should a legal serv-
ices lawyer facing increased workload from existing cases take on new
cases or matters.311
While it is appropriate for the LSC and the ABA to suggest that the
priority-setting processes used by legal services recipients should take
into account the needs of future or potential clients or that recipients
should consider the possible impact of decisions to refuse LSC fund-
ing,312 there is no ethical responsibility to potential clients that re-









recipients. With very few exceptions, ethical responsibilities flow only
to existing clients. The Model Rules do not create additional ethical
obligations to potential clients. The potential effect of requiring noti-
fication to all potential clients of the limitations on the scope of advo-
cacy, even though no actual representation is undertaken, is enormous
and may impact all attorneys, not just legal services lawyers. Legal
services recipients and their staffs must take all appropriate steps to
carry out their ethical responsibilities to actual current clients.
For example, Formal Opinion 96-399 could be read to suggest that
lawyers who specialize in a single area of law or only transactional
work may have a duty to inform all potential clients of each area of
law or activity they do not handle. The possible breadth of such an
ethical duty flowing to non-clients far exceeds the interest of potential
clients whose continued representation may be prohibited by congres-
sionally-mandated restrictions on the eligibility for services provided
by recipients of LSC funds.
CONCLUSION
The 1996 congressional restrictions on LSC-funded recipients, as
well as the restrictions being imposed at the state level, raise a number
of difficult ethical issues for providers of civil legal assistance. To
date, the restrictions have not been interpreted in a manner that
would force attorneys working for such recipients to withdraw from
cases or resign in order to act ethically. Nor may it be said that the
current restrictions are unethical, because recipients and their attor-
neys can act ethically and comply with the restrictions. The restric-
tions do make it difficult for legal services attorneys to act ethically,
and do force LSC recipients to refuse cases that should be taken or to
withdraw from ongoing representation that is essential to vindicate
the rights of low-income persons eligible for legal services. In the fu-
ture, it is possible that the restrictions imposed by funders or the inter-
pretations provided by the funding entity will so limit what attorneys
can do that they will not be able to competently represent clients or
preserve their confidences. Because of the danger that future restric-
tions will force attorneys into ethical dilemmas requiring withdrawal,
and because many of the restrictions on the type of client and the
scope of representation are unjustified under the principles of equal
access to justice, every possible effort must be made to remove such
existing restrictions and prevent future restrictions from being
imposed.
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